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“Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of 
its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?” 
- Abraham Lincoln, in a message to Congress, July 4, 1861 
INTRODUCTION 
The pages of twentieth century history are replete with the tragedy 
of Western democracy’s struggle against terrorist wars of attrition 
waged in the name of nationalism.1  In the face of those threats, the 
failure of many state responses has often led governments to resign 
themselves to policies of containment.2  However, the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, illustrated that globalization has largely 
rendered that approach impotent due to the advent of international 
networks of terrorist organizations that have unprecedented 
resources at their disposal.3  Consequently, the nations of the world 
                                                          
 1. See PETER CHALK, WEST EUROPEAN TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM:  THE 
EVOLVING DYNAMIC 5 (1996) (noting the pervasive presence of nationalist terrorism 
throughout Western Europe); Naeomi Gal-Or, Introduction to TOLERATING TERRORISM 
IN THE WEST:  AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY xiii (Naeomi Gal-Or ed., 1991) (observing 
that terrorism has become a fact of daily life in much of the western hemisphere); 
ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE:  AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 4 (1992) (analyzing the legal responses of Spain, France, Italy, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom to the threat of political violence).  Vercher notes that the 
incidence of terrorist activity increased in the early 1990s.  Id. at 1.  See PAUL 
WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY:  THE LIBERAL STATE RESPONSE 17 (2000) 
(providing that “[t]he predominant form of armed conflict in the contemporary 
world is intrastate rather than interstate, and the overwhelming majority of 
insurgencies are ethnic or ethnoreligious in their underlying motivation.”). 
 2. See GERARD HOGAN & CLIVE WALKER, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE LAW IN 
IRELAND 6-7 (1989) (noting the sporadic employment of emergency anti-terrorism 
measures during periods of unusual violence). 
 3. See CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE’S GUIDE TO THE ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION x 
(2002) (defining the phenomenon of “Third Millennium Terrorism” as that which 
emerges “through non-national, global networks and with aspirations which are 
likewise distanced from place and time”).  Walker states that this notion of Third 
Millennium Terrorism serves to complement “modernist, nationalist terrorism, the 
prime exponent for most of the twentieth century” in that “threats of globalisation 
will ensure that cultural and national causes remain vibrant [and further observes 
that] [t]he attacks and scares of autumn 2001 . . . sharpened the desire for security.” 
Id.  See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 119 (noting the ease with which terrorists, 
particularly within the European Union, can transport their bases of operation and 
their capital between countries in order to evade capture); see also Emanuel Marotta, 
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have had to consider, with renewed vigor, how to confront the 
epidemic of nationalist terrorism and the effects that this new face of 
terrorism will have on civil rights, the rule of law, and the principles 
of democracy upon which they rest.4  International Human Rights 
law, particularly in the European context, has assumed a growing role 
in the tenuous reconciliation of necessary state repression and the 
preservation of the very rights that the state purports to protect, and 
introduces another tier to the debate concerning the employment of 
counter-terrorism measures.5  In light of the increasingly 
international nature of terrorism, an understanding of the 
international legal response to the issue of counter-terrorism will be 
crucial for states in creating effective anti-terrorism legislation that 
comports with the rule of law.6  Recent legislation passed in Spain 
provides a unique opportunity to evaluate the struggle of the modern 
Western democracy to reconcile anti-terrorist measures with 
                                                          
Europol’s Role in Anti-Terrorism Policing, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 
1999, at 15 (stating that “[w]e only have to consider recent events to see the truly 
international nature of terrorism and its lack of respect for national boundaries.”); 
Max Taylor & John Horgan, Future Developments of Political Terrorism in Europe, 
TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 83, 86 (asserting that 
“[n]ationalism, religion, and ethnicity are in our view the powerful forces which will 
drive future international terrorism in Europe.”); David Veness, Low Intensity and 
High Impact Conflict, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 8 (articulating 
the new challenges in modern counter-terrorism policy engendered by the evolution 
of means, motives, and opportunities for terrorism since its emergence in the 1960s). 
 4. See CHALK, supra note 1, at xii (postulating that “some of the potential 
responses to terrorism could pose an equal, if not a greater, threat to democratic 
norms than does terrorism itself.”); see also CHRISTOPHER HEWITT, CONSEQUENCES OF 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 123 (1993) (identifying the choice regarding the degree to 
which a state is prepared to restrict the civil liberties of its citizens as one of the most 
important policy choices that a government can make); WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 
230 (stating that “[t]he tightrope between under-reaction . . . and draconian 
overreaction, leading to serious infringement of civil liberties . . . is pitched at a 
different height and angle in each case.”); Fernando Jimenez, Spain:  The Terrorist 
Challenge and the Government’s Response, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 110, 128-
29 (Alex P. Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1993) (exhorting governments to 
adhere to the rule of law in their efforts to combat terrorism); Dennis P. Riordan, 
The Rights to a Fair Trial and to Examine Witnesses Under the Spanish Constitution and the 
European Convention of Human Rights, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373, 376 (1998) 
(maintaining that “no rubric is more commonly used by states to trample on the 
fundamental rights of their citizens, particularly those of ethnic minorities, than that 
of the struggle against terrorism.”). 
 5. See Graham Head, ‘The Future is Bright . . .’—But Whom For?,  TERRORISM & 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 1999, at 19, 22 (noting the increasing integration of the 
European Court of Human Rights into legal rulings and its increasing relevance in 
British law); Marotta, supra note 3, at 16-17 (noting increased cooperation among 
European Union members regarding counter-terrorism as evidenced in the Europol 
Convention). 
 6. See Head, supra note 5, at 22 (identifying the increasing influence of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on legal rulings, particularly in light of the 
need for a uniform international system of checks and balances on counter-terrorism 
techniques). 
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fundamental civil rights, in a context that typifies the changing face 
of twentieth century terrorism.7 
On August 23, 2002, Judge Baltásar Garzón of Spain’s Audiencia 
Nacional [National Court] issued an order suspending Batasuna,8 the 
political front for the terrorist organization Euzkadi ta Askatasuma 
(“E.T.A.”) [Basque Fatherland and Liberty].9  This ruling came nearly 
three months after Spain’s Congress passed the Ley Orgánica de 
Partidos Políticos [Law of Political Parties] by an overwhelming ninety-
five percent majority on June 4, 2002.10  The law, recently declared 
constitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court,11 provided the 
legislative predicate12 upon which the Spanish Supreme Court based 
its definitive proscription of Batasuna in March, 2003.13  This 
                                                          
 7. See Shlomo Ben-Ami, Introduction to ETHNIC CHALLENGES TO THE MODERN 
NATION STATE 3 (Shlomo Ben-Ami et al. eds., 2000) (explaining that Europe’s 
immediate challenge is “that of reconciling the community’s natural diversity and 
the inevitable emphasis . . . on political self-determination . . . and the search for a 
unifying ethic . . . .”).  The ethno-identity conflict of the Basque population and the 
expression that it finds in the violent separatist movement fit the paradigm for the 
future of European terrorism that recent scholarship has promulgated.  See id. 
(noting that we live in an “age of self-determination brought to its extreme”).  The 
author cites the insolubility of Basque nationalism as exemplary of that assertion and 
identifies it as the strongest nationalist cause in Western Europe.  Id.  See Taylor & 
Horgan, supra note 3, at 86 (identifying nationalism as the driving cause behind 
modern European terrorism). 
 8. See JUZGADO CENTRAL DE INSTRUCCIÓN NO. 5, AUTO [CENTRAL COURT 
PROCEEDINGS NO. 5, ORDER], p. 344 (Aug. 26, 2002) [hereinafter ORDER] 
(determining that the suspension period would last for three years and could be 
renewed up to five years for Batasuna and its predecessor parties), at 
http://parlamento.euskadi.net/actual/auto20020826.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 9. Anthony Richards, Terrorist Groups and Political Fronts:  The IRA, Sinn Fein, the 
Peace Process and Democracy, TERRORISM & POLITICAL VIOLENCE, Winter 2001, at 72, 73 
(arguing that the term “political wing” is unsatisfactory in labeling groups such as 
Sinn Fein and Batasuna as it fails to reflect the fact such political fronts are 
subordinate to their corresponding terrorist organizations and often emerge from 
within them). 
 10. Ley Orgánica de Partídos Políticos (“L.O.P.P.”), (B.O.E., 2002, 154) (Spain) 
(replacing an existing law with new procedures to dissolve a political party that fails 
to respect democratic principles and human rights), available at http://www.igsap. 
map.es/cia/dispo/106-02.htm (last visited July 20, 2003) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 11. On March 12, 2003, the Constitutional Court issued a ruling rejecting the 
Basque Government’s contention that the Law of Political Parties violates various 
provisions of the Spanish Constitution.  S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003), 
available at http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  See EL T.C. DECLARA CONSTITUCIONAL LA LEY DE PARTIDOS 
POLÍTICOS [THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECLARES THE LAW OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL] Iurislex (Mar. 14, 2003), at http://www.iurislex.net (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 12. See id. art. 11 (conferring upon the Government and the Public Prosecutor 
the exclusive power to present to the Supreme Court a petition for the proscription 
of a political party). 
 13. TRIBUNAL SUPREMO, SENTENCIA, ILEGALIZACIÓN DE LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS 
HERRI BATASUNA, EUSKAL HERRITARROK Y BATASUNA [SUPREME COURT, JUDGMENT, 
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condemnation represents the first of its kind since Spain returned to 
democracy in 1975.14 
While the overwhelming majority of the Spanish citizenry supports 
Batasuna’s proscription, Batasuna and other groups in the Basque 
Country have mounted staunch opposition.15  On September 9, 2003, 
the Basque Autonomous Government announced its intention to 
appeal the Constitutional Court’s ruling before the European Court 
of Human Rights (“E.C.H.R.”).16  Should the E.C.H.R. admit the 
complaint, the case would represent the first time in the Court’s 
history that it has heard a claim instituted by a regional government 
against its own central State.17 
                                                          
ILLEGALIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES HERRI BATASUNA, BASQUE CITIZENS AND 
BATASUNA], Autos acumulados no 6/2002 y 7/2002 (Mar. 26, 2003) [hereinafter 
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT] (describing the procedural history in the Spanish courts 
that ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s decision to dissolve Batasuna), at 
http://www.poderjudicial.es/tribunalsupremo (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 14. See United in Error:  Spain’s Ban on Batasuna Will Not Help, GUARDIAN (London) 
(Aug. 28, 2002) (arguing that the ban is unprecedented and recommending a more 
conciliatory approach to the regulation of party activity), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,2763,781601,0.00.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review).  From the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War in 
1939 until the death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Spain existed as a totalitarian 
dictatorship.  JOSÉ SÁNCHEZ JIMÉNEZ, LA ESPAÑA CONTEMPORÁNEA:  DE 1931 A NUESTROS 
DÍAS [CONTEMPORARY SPAIN:  FROM 1931 TO THE PRESENT] 247 (1991).  The period 
preceding Franco’s death in 1975 was characterized as one of “double crisis,” in the 
economic and political spheres.  Id. at 373-74 (noting that the country suffered from 
a period of unprecedented inflation and political unrest).  Anticipating Franco’s 
impending death, various opposition parties began to mobilize resources creating 
unified platforms from which to forge a new democracy.  Id. at 383 (observing that 
the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats and the Socialist Party joined forces 
in 1974 to create the short lived “Unitary Platform”).  While this new atmosphere of 
freedom paved the way for Spain’s democratization, it also provided an opportunity 
for the nationalists to voice their agenda.  See Fernando Reinares & Oscar Jaime 
Jiménez, Countering Terrorism in a New Democracy:  The Case of Spain, in EUROPEAN 
DEMOCRACIES AGAINST TERRORISM 119, 125 (Fernando Reinares ed., 2000) (noting 
that this political expression most commonly came in the form of terrorist violence 
which escalated markedly between 1978 and 1980). 
 15. El Gobierno vasco se querella contra Garzón por sus autos sobre Batasuna [The Basque 
Government Files Charges Against Garzón for his Edicts Against Batasuna], EL PAÍS 
(Madrid) (Oct. 18, 2002) (reporting that the Basque government has filed charges of 
prevarication against Judge Garzón), available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo. 
html?xref=20021018 (on file with the American University Law Review).  
Prevarication, one of the most egregious charges that a party can bring against a 
judge or magistrate, essentially alleges that the judge has knowingly or negligently 
issued an unjust ruling.  Id. 
 16. El Gobierno vasco sale en defensa de Batasuna al recurrir en Europa la Ley de partidos 
políticos [The Basque Government Comes to Batasuna’s Defense, Challenging the Law of  
Political Parties in Europe, EL MUNDO (Madrid) (Sept. 10, 2003) ] [hereinafter 
Batasuna’s Defense], available at http://www.abc.es (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 17. El Gobierno Vasco presenta la demanda al estado español en Estrasburgo [Basque 
Government Files Claim Against the Spanish State In Strasbourg], ESTRELLA DIGITAL, Sept. 
10, 2003, at http://www.estrelladigital.es/articulo.asp?sec=esp&fech=10/09/03& 
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In examining the controversial Law of Political Parties and the 
subsequent actions of the Spanish judiciary, this Comment will situate 
those decisions in an appropriate legal and political framework with 
reference to Spanish law and European human rights doctrine.  It 
will further attempt to lend insight into the potential international 
import of the decision.  Part I of this Comment explores the history 
of E.T.A. and the evolution of Batasuna.  Part II examines the 
legislative and judicial movements that have culminated in the 
Spanish judiciary’s most recent action.  In defending the proscription 
of Batasuna, Part III examines the human rights concerns that this 
decision has awakened in light of recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence.18  
Finally, Part IV analyzes the arguments in favor of and against 
proscription and its efficacy as a weapon in the struggle against 
terrorism and concludes that the proscription of Batasuna is both a 
sound and necessary step in bringing an end to Spain’s forty-year 
battle against political terrorism. 
I. E.T.A. AND BATASUNA:  A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE 
E.T.A., one of the oldest operating Western European terrorist 
groups, is a separatist organization fighting for Basque independence 
from Spain.19  E.T.A. was formed in Bilbao by a group of young 
members of the journal, Ekin [Action].20  They hoped to create a new 
                                                          
name=espana1 (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 18. This Comment is primarily concerned with the notion of political 
proscription as a method of combating political violence in Western democracies.  As 
the constitutionality of these measures will vary pursuant to the domestic constitution 
at issue, this Comment confines its analysis largely to the decision’s consonance with 
E.C.H.R. jurisprudence. 
 19. See Jiménez, supra note 4, at 111-12 (providing a cursory history of E.T.A.’s 
historical development); Ludger Mees, Between Votes and Bullets.  Confronting Ethnic 
Identities in the Basque Country, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUDIES 798, 800 (2001) (tracing 
the historic origins of the Basque conflict to the beginning of Spanish state building 
in the fifteenth century).  Mees also notes that until the late nineteenth century, the 
Basques succeeded in maintaining a traditional and extensive system of self-
government known as the “Fueros.”  Id. at 801.  The abolition of this system in 1876 
engendered a “cultural renaissance” which paved the way for the more politicized 
and radical nationalist movements that followed.  Id. at 802, 806; see Fernando 
Reinares, Nationalism and Violence in Basque Politics, 8 CONFLICT 141, 141 (1988) 
(chronicling the evolution of Basque nationalism from its emergence at the end of 
the nineteenth century until its manifestations in modern terrorism). 
 20. See Michael Wierviorka, E.T.A. and Basque Political Violence, in THE 
LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE, 292, 296-98 (David E. Apter ed., 1997) (explaining that 
the students editing the journal Action established groups in various cities in the 
Basque Country and then combined with the PNV youth organization Egi to form 
E.T.A.); La ofensiva terrorista: De la universidad a la ‘acción armada’ [The Terrorist 
Offensive: From the University to “Armed Action”], EL PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter Terrorist 
Offensive] (stating that the foundation of Action took place in 1952 at the Jesuit 
University of Deusto), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los50.html 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
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nationalist organization that would free the Partido Nacionalista Vasco21 
(“P.N.V.”)[Basque Nationalist Party] from the quagmire in which it 
was entrenched during Franco’s oppressive regime.22  On July 31, 
1959 the young dissidents formed E.T.A. on four basic principles:  the 
defense of Euskera [the Basque language], ethnocentrism, anti-
Spanish ideology, and the independence of the territory claimed by 
the Basques, including the northern Spanish provinces of the Basque 
Country and Navarra as well as the French provinces of Basse-
Navarra, Labourd and Soule.23  E.T.A. openly espoused the notion of 
the lucha armada [armed struggle] and committed its first act of 
terrorism on July 18, 1961.24  The attack was a failed attempt to derail 
a train of Franco’s volunteers en route to San Sebastian for the 
commemoration of the military strike that gave rise to the Spanish 
Civil War in 1936.25 
Due to the internal ideological schism that occurred between 1972 
and 1974, the group split into two factions, the “political-military” 
branch and the “E.T.A.-militia” (E.T.A.-M).26  The political-military 
                                                          
 21. Prior to the birth of E.T.A., the P.N.V. existed as the lone political force 
advocating for the Basque nationalist cause.  See Wierviorka, supra note 20, at 296 
(explaining the birth of E.T.A. as a product of the crisis within traditional Basque 
nationalist institutions and the sentiments of impotence that that crisis engendered).  
Wierviorka goes on to note that as the P.N.V. became increasingly marginalized from 
the regime, internal discord grew, ultimately resulting in the emergence of a 
contingent of critical younger members disillusioned by the impotence of its party.  
Id.  The students, editors of the journal Action, formally broke ties with the P.N.V. 
and formed E.T.A. in order to vindicate the Basque identity and cultural heritage.  
Id. at 297-98. 
 22. See CHALK, supra note 1, at 55 (explaining that under Franco’s regime, which 
lasted from 1939-1975, “the use of the Euskera language was ruthlessly suppressed in 
an attempt to eliminate a regionalism which was seen to represent a fundamental 
threat to the Fascist Falange”).  This attack on what Basques regarded as the pillar of 
their culture provided grist for the terrorist mill that E.T.A. was to become.  Id. 
 23. See Montserrat Guibernau, Spain:  Catalonia and the Basque Country, in 
DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 55, 56 (Michael O’Neill & Dennis Austin eds., 
2000) (tracing Basque claims of sovereignty to their status as the only remaining pre-
Aryan race in Europe).  Guibernau also notes that the Basque language is the only 
pre-Indo-European language still used within Europe.  Id.  See also VERCHER, supra 
note 1, at 168 (stating that “E.T.A. patterns itself somewhat after the I.R.A. and that 
some observers have described E.T.A.’s short-range goal as one of trying to 
‘Ulsterize’ the Basque region, i.e., provoke a military intervention to pacify the 
area.”).  “E.T.A. expects that such intervention would irretrievably alienate the 
Basque population and rally further support for E.T.A. against central authority.”  Id.  
See generally Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20 (recounting the history of the Basque 
separatist movement). 
 24. See Reinares, supra note 19, at 144-46 (tracing the origins of E.T.A.); Terrorist 
Offensive, supra note 20 (summarizing the significant chronological history of E.T.A.’s 
terrorist offensive). 
 25. See Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20 (reporting that the failed attack resulted 
in immediate escalation of police action leading to the arrest of the group’s 
directorate and nearly to its dissolution). 
 26. Primera gran escisión y comienzo de las acciones indiscriminadas [The Terrorist 
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branch advocated a combination of the political structure typical of a 
legitimate organization with political pressure in the form of violence 
(excluding individual targets) while E.T.A.-M espoused a policy of 
“legitimate” violence.27  In 1973, shortly after its formation, E.T.A.’s 
operatives assassinated Luis Carrero Blanco, the President of the 
Government and Franco’s designated successor.28  This pattern of 
violence has continued without respite and, since its inception, E.T.A. 
has claimed responsibility for 3,391 terrorist attacks that have killed 
836 people and injured 2,367.29 
The first political arm of E.T.A. emerged in 1976, in the Irish 
tradition of Sinn Fein,30 and the three subsequent years produced at 
least 82 other legal organizations.31  In April, 1978, four of the radical 
nationalist Basque parties formed a coalition group on behalf of 
E.T.A.  This group, Herri Batasuna (“H.B.”), later became the 
principal political wing of E.T.A.32  H.B. promoted a nationalist policy 
founded on Marxist-Leninist ideology and espoused five central, non-
negotiable tenets: 
1. Legalization of all Basque parties. 
2.  Expulsion of all national police forces from the Basque 
territory. 
3. Recognition of Basque national sovereignty, the right to 
self-determination, and the creation of an independent 
state that would include Navarra and the provinces of the 
French Basque Country. 
4. Improvement of conditions for Basque workers. 
                                                          
Offensive:  First Great Split and Beginning of Indiscriminate Actions], EL PAÍS (Madrid), 
available at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los70.html (last visited Sept. 
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id.; see also Reinares, supra note 19, at 148 (noting that the assassination of 
Franco’s successor destroyed the nascent government’s aspirations of continuity, 
bringing political uncertainty to the regime). 
 29. Clausurada la sede de Batasuna en Pamplona y ocho más en el resto de Navarra 
[Batasuna Headquarters in Pamplona and Eight Others in the Rest of Navarra Closed], EL 
MUNDO (Madrid), at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/08/26/espana/ 
1030359464.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 30. See Mees, supra note 19, at 810 (quoting Batasuna’s spokesman Arnaldo Otegi 
as stating that “Ireland was a mirror for us, and so was the republican movement.”).  
Mees notes that social movements, including nationalist movements, possess a 
“cumulative power” which “not only repeat[s] many of the themes of their 
predecessors . . . but build[s] on the practices and themes of the past.”  Id. at 809. 
 31. Terrorist Offensive, supra note 20. 
 32. Id. (elaborating that this coalition decided to form an official political party 
in 1980 but was unable to secure official recognition until 1986). 
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5. Declaration of Euskera as the official and primary language 
of the Basque Country.33 
The coalition’s strategic long-range agenda was to effect total Basque 
autonomy from Spain.34 
The 1980s represented the bloodiest decade in the history of the 
organization.35  During this period, E.T.A. embarked on a campaign 
of indiscriminate violence, employing execution-style assassinations 
and car bombings.36  On June 19, 1987, the group placed a car bomb 
outside of a major department store in Barcelona, resulting in twenty-
one dead and more than forty-five wounded.37 
The 1990s saw the arrival of a new strategy under which E.T.A. 
based its actions on the maintenance of armed conflict as an end in 
itself and also broadened its list of potential targets, previously 
limited to members of security forces, to include politicians, members 
                                                          
 33. Id.; see also Reinares, supra note 19, at 149 (noting that H.B.’s policy, in 
support of E.T.A.’s cause, was to decline any legislative seats that it claimed in 
elections); Wieviorka, supra note 20, at 325 (explaining that H.B., closely linked to 
E.T.A., employed its political weight to promote E.T.A.’s cause in various arenas 
including trade unions, women’s movements, anti-nuclear movements and Basque 
cultural movements). 
 34. Peter Waldmann, From the Vindication of Honor to Blackmail:  The Changing Role 
of E.T.A. On Society and Politics in the Basque Region of Spain, in TOLERATING TERRORISM 
IN THE WEST:  AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1, 11 (explaining E.T.A.’s 
short- and long-term strategies).  Shortly after Garzón issued his order, Juan Jose 
Ibarretxe, the lehendakari [president] of the Basque Country, put forth a proposal for 
a “State of Free Association.”  Ibarretxe plantea convertir Euskadi en un Estado libre 
asociado con una justicia propia [Ibarretxe Proposes the Conversion of Euskadi into a “State of 
Free Association” with its Own Judiciary], EL MUNDO (Madrid), (Sept. 27, 2002), available 
at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2002/09/27/espana/1033120813.html (on 
file with the American University Law Review).  The plan would confer upon the 
Basque Country a status similar to that of a federal state and has as its objective the 
achievement of “shared sovereignty” with the central Spanish state.  Id.  However, the 
European Union has already demonstrated its disapproval of such a plan.  On 
October 22, 2002, the European Commission adopted unanimously a declaration 
stating that Ibarretxe’s plan is incompatible with the Treaty of the European Union.  
La Comisión Europea asegura que el plan de Ibarretxe es incompatible con el tratado de la U.E. 
[The European Commission Assures that Ibarretxe’s Plan is Incompatible with the E.U. 
Treaty], ESTRELLA DIGITAL, Oct. 23, 2002 [hereinafter Ibarretxe’s Plan], at 
http://www.estrelladigital.es/021023/articulos/espana/espana1.asp. 
 35. La ofensiva más sangrienta, los G.A.L. y las confrontaciones de Argel [The Bloodiest 
Offensive, the G.A.L. and the Confrontations of Argel], EL PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter 
Bloodiest Offensive], at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los80.html (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).  It is 
interesting to note that 1980, the year that the first autonomous elections for the 
Basque Parliament took place, witnessed the most deaths from terrorism of any year 
between the period 1968 and 1986.  See Maria J. Funes, Social Responses to Political 
Violence in the Basque Country, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 493, 495 (1998) (recording a 
marked increase in violence during the transition period and years of nascent 
democracy); Reinares, supra note 19, at 151 (reporting that 96 people died in 
terrorist attacks in 1980). 
 36. Bloodiest Offensive, supra note 35. 
 37. Id. 
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of the judiciary, civil servants, and journalists.38  Throughout its 
twenty-year existence, H.B. maintained a symbiotic relationship with 
E.T.A., often including known or incarcerated E.T.A. members on its 
ballots.39  In 1996, Judge Garzón established an affirmative link 
between H.B. and E.T.A., unveiling an E.T.A. propaganda campaign 
in which the political party participated.  E.T.A. produced a 
videotape that H.B. distributed to public and private television 
stations for broadcast during free air time delegated for use by 
political parties in anticipation of an upcoming election.40  This 
discovery resulted in the prosecution and incarceration of the H.B. 
National Cabinet.41 
In 1998, only months after the dissipation of H.B. due to the 
conviction and imprisonment of its National Cabinet, Euskal 
Herritarrok (“E.H.”) [Basque citizens], a new electoral platform 
appeared in Bilbao.42  The new party subsumed the remaining 
vestiges of H.B. and adopted the ideology of its predecessor.43  
Neither the Spanish political directorate nor the public doubted 
E.H.’s existence as the political guise under which H.B. continued to 
operate.44 
On September 12, 1998 the Basque nationalists and the Euskal 
Herritarrok, along with the Izquierda Unida [United Left] and other 
organizations, signed the Estella-Lizarra Pact in which they pledged to 
search for a negotiated solution to the violence plaguing the Basque 
Country.45 Only days after signing the pact, E.T.A. announced an 
indefinite unilateral cease-fire.46  The cease-fire lasted nearly fifteen 
                                                          
 38. El golpe de Bidart [Bidart’s Coup], EL PAÍS  [hereinafter Bidart’s Coup] 
(reporting that between 1995 and 2000, twelve members of the Partido Popular 
[Popular Party] and the ex-president of the Constitutional Court died at the hands of 
E.T.A.), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a4/los90.html (last visited Sept. 
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 39. See Waldmann, supra note 34, at 11-13 (noting the extensive connections that 
existed between E.T.A. and its political front H.B.).  H.B. received contributions 
from E.T.A.’s coffers and H.B. has assisted in the construction of arms and supply 
depots.  Id. at 12. 
 40. El entorno político de E.T.A:  HB/EH [E.T.A.’s Political Environment:  HB/EH], EL 
PAÍS (Madrid) [hereinafter E.T.A.’s Political Environment], at http://www.elpais.es/ 
temas/eta/menua/a2/hbeh.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 41. El entorno de E.T.A. [E.T.A.’s Environment], EL MUNDO (Madrid) (noting that 
at the time of the discovery much of the Basque population supported the 
proscription of H.B.), at http://w3.el-mundo.es/eta/entornobatasuna.html (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 42. E.T.A.’s Political Environment, supra note 40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38. 
 46. See Mees, supra note 19, at 799 (noting the significance of the cease-fire as the 
first serious attempt at reconciliation since the emergence of Basque political 
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months until, on November 28, 1999, E.T.A. announced that its 
operatives would return to action.47  E.T.A. consummated this threat 
on January 21, 2000 with the assassination of an army lieutenant 
colonel in Madrid.48  On December 12 of the same year, in response 
to 23 assassinations since the previous January, the various national 
political parties, the Partido Popular (“P.P.”) [Popular Party] and the 
Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles (“P.S.O.E.”) [Spanish Workers 
Socialist Party], signed the Acuerdo por las libertades y contra el terrorismo 
[Agreement for Freedom and Against Terrorism] in which these 
traditionally antagonistic parties pledged to work together to design a 
common strategy.49  E.T.A. responded to the pact with the 
assassination of a politician in Barcelona within 48 hours of its 
signing.50 
Three years after the birth of E.H., the elections of May 2001 
produced the worst results that the party, in any of its forms, had 
witnessed in its twenty-two year existence.51  One month after E.H.’s 
electoral debacle, Batasuna emerged as its successor,52 inheriting a 
political history defined by its inextricable links to E.T.A. and the 
imprimatur of complicity that such a history confers.53 
                                                          
violence); 15 meses sin muertos [15 Months Without Deaths], EL PAÍS (Madrid) 
(reporting that during the fifteen-month cease-fire more than 100 prisoners were 
released from prison, eighty-two of whom were serving preventative detentions and 
twenty-three others who were released at the discretion of the government), at 
http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a2/15meses.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2002) (on file with the American University Law Review).  
 47. See Mees, supra note 19, at 799 (lamenting the return to violence, which 
marked the conclusion of a year without fatalities and was characterized by 
clandestine communications between the government and paramilitaries and the 
employment of increasingly institutionalized discourse); Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38. 
 48. See Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38 (explaining that the assassination was the first 
in a series of attacks that eventually resulted in the abandonment of the Lizarra Pact). 
 49. See La anterior legislatura vasca El PP y el PSOE asumen juntos por primera vez y con 
un pacto la política antiterrorista [The Prior Basque Legislature The PP and the PSOE 
Confront Antiterrorist Politics Together for the First Time with Nonpartisan Pact], EL PAÍS 
(Madrid) (providing a history of legislative agreements between political parties in 
their effort to create a united front with which to combat terrorism), at 
http://www.elpais.es/temas/eta/menua/a2/pacto.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2002) 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 50. Bidart’s Coup, supra note 38. 
 51. E.T.A.’s Political Environment, supra note 40 (noting that the party garnered 
only seven parliamentary seats as compared to 14 in the previous election). 
 52. Id. (highlighting the relationship between E.T.A. and its various political 
fronts). 
 53. E.T.A.’s connection with H.B./E.H./Batasuna was not merely political but 
also economic.  E.T.A. financed the party until 1992.  After 1992, such subsides 
continued by way of a complex business structure known as the Proyecto Udaletxe 
[Udaletxe Project].  ORDER, supra note 8, HECHOS [FACTS] para. 1.4.  Also, before its 
transformation into Batasuna, H.B. routinely included various members of E.T.A. on 
its election ballots.  For example, in the Basque Parliamentary elections of 1980, H.B. 
included on its ticket two members of E.T.A. who at the time of the election were 
serving prison sentences for their involvement in terrorist activity.  Id. para. 2.  The 
SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/3/2003  11:47 AM 
1542 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1531 
Today, E.T.A. maintains extensive international connections, and 
reportedly has ties to the I.R.A. 54  Its members have attended Middle 
Eastern terrorist training camps, and the Castro government has, on 
occasion, provided safe haven and training for E.T.A. members.55 
II. CURRENT CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PANORAMA IN SPAIN 
A. The Constitution of 1978:  The Rebirth of Democracy 
While modern Spanish constitutional tradition finds its roots in the 
early nineteenth century, the modern democratic era began with the 
adoption of the 1978 Constitution.56  The new Constitution, 
composed of ten parts divided into chapters and articles, extended 
political freedoms through which the government provided for the 
right of political association and the freedom of expression following 
the legalization of political parties.57 
The Constitution contains three basic classes of rights:  
fundamental rights, constitutional rights, and those rights associated 
with social and economic policy.58  Each class of rights enjoys a 
corresponding degree of constitutional protection.  The fundamental 
rights appear in Chapter Two of Part I of the Constitution, entitled 
“Fundamental Rights and Duties.”  That chapter enshrines the 
freedoms of political parties59 and of association.60 
                                                          
existence of H.B., since its inception, as E.T.A.’s “institutional front” is further 
evidenced in various texts compiled from E.T.A.’s official publication “Zutabe.”  Id.  
Cited excerpts from the publication reveal the political party’s subordination to the 
directives of the terrorist organization.  Id.  The magazine contains a section 
dedicated to “KAS meetings.”  The June 1978 issue included a reference to the 
campaign strategy of H.B.  E.T.A. dictated that the political party would employ the 
slogan, “Frente a la Constitución, la Alternativa” [Against the Constitution, the 
Alternative].  Id. 
 54. Jimenez, supra note 4, at 112 (noting in addition the international 
connections that E.T.A. allegedly maintains with groups in Nicaragua, Cuba, France, 
and the Middle East). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally CHARLOTTE VILLIERS, THE SPANISH LEGAL TRADITION:  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE SPANISH LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM vii (1999) (tracing the origins 
of Spanish constitutionalism and explaining the significance of the 1978 
Constitution). 
 57. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA (“C.E.”) arts. 6 & 20 (Spain) (enshrining the 
legalization of political parties and the freedom of expression, respectively); see also 
VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 18 (noting that the liberal atmosphere of the post-Franco 
political regime influenced the creation of the 1978 Constitution). 
 58. See ELENA MERINO-BLANCO, THE SPANISH LEGAL SYSTEM 26 (1996) (noting that 
citizens may plead violations of fundamental rights in the Constitutional Court but 
must plead violations of other rights pursuant to ordinary proceedings); see also 
VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 25-26 (noting that the first title establishes that all rights 
that the Constitution affords are not held in equal regard).  No law may contradict 
the basic contents of these rights.  Id. 
 59. C.E. art. 6.  Article 6 states: 
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The Constitution accords this class of fundamental rights the 
highest form of protection, allowing for their regulation only through 
the passage of an Organic Law.61  Article 10 requires that the 
interpretation of all fundamental rights and freedoms conform to the 
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all 
other international treaties ratified in Spain.62 
Finally, Chapter Five of Part I provides for those circumstances 
under which the government may suspend the rights and liberties of 
citizens.63  It is within this constitutional framework that this 
Comment seeks to evaluate the proscription of Batasuna. 
B. Legislative and Judicial Actions:  The Path to Proscription 
1. The Law of Political Parties 
The Spanish Congress approved the Law of Political Parties64 on 
June 4, 2002 by an overwhelming 95 percent majority.65  The law, 
effective on June 27, 2002, served to amend the existing law that had 
governed political parties since its passage in 1978.66  The new law 
                                                          
Political parties are the expression of political pluralism, they contribute to 
the formation and expression of the will of the people[,] and [they] are an 
essential instrument for political participation. Their creation and the 
exercise of their activities are free in so far as they respect the Constitution 
and the law.  Their internal structure and their functioning must be 
democratic. 
Id. 
 60. C.E. art. 22 (providing that “[a]ssociations which pursue ends or use means 
legally defined as criminal offenses are illegal.”).  It also prohibits all associations of a 
paramilitary nature.  Id.  Article 22 expressly contemplates the suspension of an 
association’s activities and also its dissolution upon the issuance of a court order.  Id. 
 61. See C.E. art. 81.1 (providing that leyes organicas [organic laws] regulate 
fundamental rights and civil liberties, ratify Statutes of Autonomy, the general 
electoral regime, and any other matter for which the Constitution provides); see also 
MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 31 (explaining that an Organic Law requires the 
approval of an absolute majority of the Congress whereas ordinary legislation 
requires only a simple majority).  Additionally, an Organic Law relates specifically to 
certain subject matters specified by the Constitution such as fundamental rights.  Id.  
Any ordinary law that sought to regulate a matter which, pursuant to the 
Constitution, required an Organic Law for regulation, would be unconstitutional per 
se.  Id. at 32. 
 62. C.E. art. 10. 
 63. C.E. art. 55 (providing for the suspension of the rights enshrined in articles 
17.2, 18.2, and 18.3 pursuant to the passage of an organic law). 
 64. LEY ORGÁNICA DE PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS (Spain) (“L.O.P.P.”). 
 65. See Batasuna proceso de ilegalización [Batasuna: The Proscription Process], EL 
MUNDO (Madrid) (providing a chronology of salient events that facilitated the 
potential proscription of Batasuna), at http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2002/ 
08/espana/batasuna/claves.html (last visited July 2, 2003) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 66. See L.O.P.P. Exposición de Motivos [Purpose Statement] sec. I (stating that 
the 1978 version of the law had become antiquated and insufficient to provide for 
the modern political climate). 
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regulates the creation, activities, and dissolution of all registered 
political parties.67  With regard to dissolution, the law provides that 
only the Public Prosecutor or the Government, at the behest of the 
Congress of Deputies or the Senate, may submit a complaint68 to a 
special panel of the Supreme Court requesting the definitive 
proscription of a political party.69  Upon receiving the complaint, the 
Supreme Court will then notify the party of the proceeding against it, 
at which time it will have eight days to respond.70  When a response is 
received, the court will consider the original complaint and may then 
rule on its admissibility.71  Once the court admits the complaint, it 
may then initiate a discretionary period of discovery upon the 
conclusion of which it has twenty days to issue an order.72  The law 
provides that a ruling of illegality will take immediate effect and 
affords no right of appeal with the exception of the “recurso de 
amparo”73 [protective appeal] before the Constitutional Court.74 
                                                          
 67. See L.O.P.P. art. 11.1 (conferring upon the government and the Public 
Prosecutor the exclusive authority to request judicial dissolution of a political party).  
Criminal proceedings in Spain, such as those in the instant case, consist of three 
denominations of offenses:  public, semi-public, and private. VILLIERS, supra note 56, 
at 137.  These classifications determine who must proceed with prosecution.  Id.  The 
Ministerio Fiscal [Public Prosecutor] generally files and prosecutes the majority of all 
cases. Id. 
 68. L.O.P.P. art. 11.1 to 11.2. 
 69. See id. art. 11.2 (establishing a Supreme Court “special panel” as the entity 
empowered to order the definitive dissolution of a party); see also LEY ORGÁNICA DEL 
PODER JUDICIAL (“L.O.P.J.”) art. 61 (Spain) (providing that a special panel of the 
Supreme Court shall consist of the President of the Supreme Court, the Presidents of 
the Supreme Court’s five chambers, and the most senior and most junior magistrates 
of each chamber), available at http://www.igsap.map.es/cia/dispo/lopjL1.html (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire national territory and consists of five 
chambers.  MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 81.  These five chambers include civil, 
criminal, administrative, social, and military.  Id. 
 70. L.O.P.P. art. 11.3. 
 71. See id. (providing that a complaint will be inadmissible in three 
circumstances:  if an unauthorized party submits the complaint, if it fails to comply 
with the procedural or substantive requisites for admission, or if it is manifestly 
unsubstantiated).   
 72. Id. art. 11.4.  In the event that the court dismisses a complaint, charges may 
be refiled only upon the discovery of new evidence not contained in the original 
complaint.  Id. art. 11.7. 
 73. Id. art. 7; see also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 100.  The protective 
appeal is an appellate procedure that safeguards the fundamental rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution and exists as the last domestic appeal 
available to a Spanish citizen.  Id. at 101.  According to Merino-Blanco, this type of 
appeal 
is only justified when judicial intervention has proved inefficient, because 
the object of the recurso de amparo [protective appeal] is protection against 
any act of public power which violates any of the following rights:  article 14 
CE (principle of non-discrimination), articles 15-19 CE (fundamental rights 
and public freedoms) and article 30(2) CE (right to military objection). 
Id. 
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The Spanish legislature offered three fundamental justifications for 
the law’s passage.75  First, in noting that nearly twenty-five years have 
transpired since Spain’s transition to democracy, the legislature 
stated that the law seeks to reflect the experience and institutional 
evolution that has occurred during that period.76 The law further 
seeks to “renovate” certain norms anchored in antiquated legislative 
and judicial priorities that have subsequently proven insufficient and 
inadequate in confronting the realities of the present.77  Finally, the 
authors of the law sought to fill a perceived legislative void by 
articulating concrete constitutional requisites for the organization 
and activities of political parties in a democracy.78 
The new law consists of four chapters, the most salient reforms of 
which appear in Chapter Two.79  This chapter governs the 
organization, functioning, and activities of parties and requires that 
                                                          
 74. L.O.P.P. art. 11.7.  The Constitutional Court is an autonomous entity and 
does not fall within the ambit of the judicial branch:  it is subject only to relevant 
provisions of the Constitution and other laws that created it.  MERINO-BLANCO, supra 
note 58, at 95.  The Constitutional Court exists as a mechanism for controlling acts of 
the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power, and its primary function is the 
interpretation of the Constitution.  Id. at 97.  As an autonomous entity, the court also 
has the authority to evaluate the constitutionality of actions of the Executive and the 
Judiciary.  VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 129.  The court is composed of twelve members; 
the Congress chooses four members, the Senate four, the Executive two, and the 
Consejo General del Poder Judicial [General Council of the Judiciary Branch] chooses 
the remaining two.  MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 97.  Members are generally 
lawyers, judges, civil servants or university professors, all of whom practice in the 
legal field and have more than fifteen years of experience and “recognized 
professional standing.”  Id.  This Court also holds the power to review the actions of 
the Executive and the Judiciary for consonance with the Constitution as provided for 
in the protective appeal.  Id. 
 75. L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement. 
 76. See id. § I (reasoning that since Spain’s return to democracy, the protagonism 
and constitutional significance of political parties in Spain has increased significantly 
and that modern legislation should reflect such evolution). 
 77. See id. (considering the trend of legislative modernization that has 
accompanied the growth of other institutional actors, such as political foundations 
and associations). 
 78. See id. (noting the failure of previous legislation to clearly and explicitly 
prescribe the duties and obligations that the constitution imposes on political 
parties). 
 79. The first chapter provides for the creation of political parties and sets forth 
the requirements governing their registration with the Ministry of the Interior.  
L.O.P.P. arts. 1-5.  The second chapter regulates the organization, function, and 
activities of political parties.  Id. arts. 6-9.  Article 6 of this chapter provides that 
parties must conform their organization, functions, and, activities to the principles of 
democracy, the Constitution, and to all relevant law.  Id. art. 6.  Article 9 sets forth, in 
detail, the activities that can result in proscription.  Id. art. 9.  Chapter Three 
regulates the dissolution of political parties including the procedure and effects 
related thereto.  Id. arts. 10-12.  The fourth chapter governs the financing of political 
parties.  Id. art. 13. 
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their activities be democratic and consonant with the Constitution 
and all relevant legislation.80 
The heart of the legislation appears in Article 9 of Chapter Two, 
which governs the actions of political organizations and enumerates 
those activities that may result in proscription.81  It provides, in 
pertinent part, that political parties are obliged to respect 
constitutional values and that a party may be declared illegal if its 
activities jeopardize established principles of democracy.82  More 
specifically, the law provides for proscription when any such party 
seeks, in a “recurring and egregious manner,” to erode or destroy 
fundamental freedoms by engaging in any of an exhaustive list of 
proscribed activities.83 
Article 10 provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of a special panel 
of the Supreme Court84 and Article 11 outlines the procedure by 
which a political party may be declared illegal.85 Finally, Article 12 
articulates the substantive and practical effects of such a dissolution.86 
2. Garzón’s order:  The suspension of Batasuna 
Judge Garzón’s extensive order cited a multitude of justifications 
for the suspension and was no doubt the product of the unrelenting 
terrorist campaign that E.T.A. has waged on Spanish society 
throughout the last forty years.87  However, Batasuna’s temporary 
suspension came in the wake of an E.T.A. attack that claimed that 
                                                          
 80. L.O.P.P. arts. 6-9. 
 81. Id. art. 9. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Article 9 expressly states that the court may declare a political party illegal if it 
engages in any of the following: 
a)  Systematic affronts to fundamental rights and freedoms by fomenting, 
justifying, or excusing affronts to the life or integrity of the citizenry or the 
exclusion or persecution of an individual based on his ideology, religion, 
nationality, race, sex, or sexual orientation. 
b) Fomenting, providing, or legitimizing violence as a means of reaching 
political objectives or of preventing the exercise of democracy, pluralism, 
and political freedom. 
c) Politically assisting or supporting the actions of terrorist organizations in 
order to subvert the existing constitutional order or egregiously affecting 
public order for the purpose of subjecting public officials, particular 
individuals, or the population in general, to a climate of terror. 
Id. art. 9.2(a)-(c). 
 84. See L.O.P.P. art. 10 (vesting the power of proscription in a special panel of 
the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 61 of the Ley Organica del Poder Judicial 
[Organic Law of the Judiciary]). 
 85. L.O.P.P. art. 11. 
 86. See L.O.P.P. art. 12 (including such measures as the closure of party 
establishments and the transfer of assets to the Treasury). 
 87. See generally ORDER, supra note 8 (tracing E.T.A.’s history of violence and the 
symbiotic role that H.B.-E.H.-Batasuna has played in that enterprise). 
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lives of two people, one of whom was a six-year old girl, at a beach 
resort in the summer of 2002.88  While this tragic event and 
Batasuna’s subsequent failure to join in a multi-partisan 
condemnation of the attack likely served as catalysts for the 
Government’s action, nationalists might argue that Garzón calculated 
the timing of his order so as to preclude Batasuna from running in 
the Basque elections of May 2003.89  The elimination of Batasuna 
from the Basque municipal elections resulted in a substantial increase 
in electoral support for its rival party, the Basque Nationalist Party. 90 
Pursuant to the Law of Political Parties, a definitive declaration of 
illegality falls within the exclusive province of the Supreme Court.91  
However, the Penal Code provides for temporary suspensions in 
situations in which an organization is under investigation for alleged 
illicit activity.92  Title 21 of the Penal Code,93 “Crimes Against the 
                                                          
 88. See DEMANDA PRESENTADA POR LA FISCALÍA [PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT] 12 
(Sept. 2, 2002) (citing Batasuna’s failure to condemn the attack as demonstrative of 
its support for the actions of E.T.A.), at http://www.elmundo.es/especiales/2002/ 
08/espana/fiscalia.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 89. See Javier Pérez Royo, El derecho de Batasuna a no condenar [Batasuna’s Right Not 
to Condemn], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (Aug. 20, 2002) (criticizing the measure for punishing 
silence rather than affirmative acts and raising doubt as to the constitutionality of the 
Law of Political Parties), available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html (on file with 
the American University Law Review).  Also of note in considering the impetus for 
the dissolution is the fact that the Basque Country will hold elections in May.  Given 
that the proscription process is one that requires the intervention of various 
governmental and judicial entities, Garzón could conceivably have timed his 
suspension to afford sufficient time in which to achieve Batasuna’s definitive 
proscription before the May elections.  See Jane Walker, Beating Batasuna, GUARDIAN 
(London) (Aug. 27, 2002) (stating that rival parties had hoped for Batasuna’s 
proscription as the party controlled sixty-two town councils and held seven 
parliamentary seats), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/ 
0,2763,781175,00.html (on file with the American University Law Review); El 
Tribunal Supremo da un plazo de 20 días a Batasuna para que presente sus alegaciones [The 
Supreme Court Gives Batasuna a Period of Twenty Days to Present Their Arguments], EL 
MUNDO (Madrid), Feb. 15, 2003 (stating that as of February 14, 2003, Batasuna will 
have twenty days to submit allegations and evidence regarding its proscription), 
available at http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2003/02/14/espana/1045230214. 
html (on file with the American University Law Review).  At the conclusion of those 
twenty days, the Supreme Court will then have an additional twenty days to issue its 
ruling.  Id. 
 90. See El PNV consigue un importante incremento en el País Vasco [The P.N.V. Gains 
Important Momentum in the Basque Country], EL MUNDO (Madrid), (May 26, 2003) 
(noting that the P.N.V. saw substantial electoral gains in the Basque municipalities of 
Bilbao, Vizcaya, Guipúzcoa, and Álava), available at http://www.elmundo.es/ 
elmundo/2003/05/25/enespecial/1053890378.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 91. L.O.P.P. art. 11 (establishing that the Supreme Court Special Panel is the 
only entity empowered to affect the permanent dissolution of a party). 
 92. See CÓDIGO PENAL (“C.P.”) arts. 129 & 520 (Spain) (providing for temporary 
measure of suspension and its corollary effects). 
 93. Id.; see ORDER, supra note 8, at 324 (further grounding Garzón’s 
precautionary measure in relevant provisions of the Penal Code). 
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Constitution,” confers upon the judiciary the authority to adopt such 
precautionary measures.94  Those measures serve to prevent the 
continuation of the allegedly illicit activity and its deleterious effects 
during the period of investigation.95  Batasuna is currently under 
investigation for alleged complicity with a terrorist organization, a 
crime expressly proscribed in the Penal Code.96  Pursuant to the 
Penal Code, Judge Garzón’s order provided for a three-year 
suspension (renewable up to five years) of Batasuna’s political 
activities and the closure of its headquarters, offices, and all other 
locations that the organization or its members occupied.97  In 
accordance with Article 23 of the Constitution, the order allowed 
Batasuna’s elected members to continue in their individual 
parliamentary capacities.98  The temporary nature of the order was 
intended to afford the court sufficient time in which to conduct an 
investigation regarding the party’s alleged criminal links to E.T.A.99 
Judge Garzón’s order prohibited all public, private, and 
institutional activities and disbanded all public organizations, banks, 
notaries, foundations, associations, societies, and other entities 
related to Batasuna.100 It also contained a provision requiring the 
                                                          
 94. See C.P. art. 129.1 (providing for the imposition of various sanctions 
including the temporary dissolution of the association, suspension of its activities, 
and the closure of its offices, businesses or other establishments during the 
provisional period).  The National Court, by virtue of the crimes alleged, has 
jurisdiction over the present case.  This court is a collegiate tribunal located in 
Madrid and has jurisdiction over administrative, criminal, and labor matters 
throughout the nation.  See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 86  (noting that this 
court has jurisdiction over criminal cases involving, for example, offenses against the 
state, drug trafficking, financial crimes, terrorism, and extradition of prisoners). 
 95. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 323 (confirming that the purpose of the 
temporary suspension is to prevent the continuation of criminal activity and its 
effects); see also C.P. art. 129.3 (enumerating the precautionary measures at the 
tribunal’s disposition). 
 96. See C.P. art. 515.2 (providing for the proscription and dissolution of terrorist 
organizations); id. art. 516.2 (prescribing six to twelve years of incarceration and a six 
to fourteen year exclusion from public office as sanctions for participation in a 
terrorist organization); see also ORDER, supra note 8, at 343 (basing the order on a 
theory of Batasuna’s inextricable links with E.T.A.’s terrorist enterprise).  In his 
order, Judge Garzón proceeds on the theory that Batasuna-E.H.-H.B. is not merely a 
political and ideological ally of E.T.A. but rather that it actually forms part of the 
same terrorist machinery.  Id. at 323.  Judge Garzón states that “a terrorist is not only 
he who perpetrates terrorist acts, but also he who incites, directs, subsidizes and gives 
life to the organizational complex, constructing a common edifice that gives life to 
the group.” Id. at 318. 
 97. ORDER, supra note 8, at 343-48. 
 98. Id.  Article 23 of the Constitution protects the equal access of all citizens to 
participate in elections either as a candidate or as a voter.  C.E. art. 23. 
 99. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 331 (identifying the purpose of the temporary 
measure as precluding the continuation of criminal activity and its effects in the case 
of illicit terrorist association during the period of investigation). 
 100. See id. at 344 (providing for such endeavors undertaken in the names of H.B. 
and E.H. or under any other name that the group should choose to adopt). 
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Ertzaintza (Basque autonomous police force) to identify and close all 
centers of Batasuna activity not included explicitly in Parts I and II of 
the Order.101  The Order suspended all financial aid to Batasuna.102  It 
also suspended water, electricity, and telephone services, prohibited 
the party from conducting any financial business.103 Finally, the order 
prohibited Batasuna from organizing demonstrations, marches, or 
rallies and proscribed the use of any form of propaganda including 
the display of symbols associated with the group.104  Finally, the Order 
required Batasuna to terminate any web page or electronic service 
that it operated on the Internet.105 
3. Supreme and Constitutional Court decisions:  A definitive proscription 
On September 2, 2002, pursuant to the Law of Political Parties, 
both the Public Prosecutor and the Government filed requests for the 
proscription of Batasuna with the Supreme Court.106  However, before 
that Court could reach a final decision, the Basque Government 
called upon the Constitutional Court to rule on an interlocutory 
appeal challenging the constitutionality of the law itself.107 
                                                          
 101. See id. at 346 (requiring the closure of all such establishments within four 
days of identification). 
 102. See id. (mandating the freezing of all of Batasuna’s assets and providing a 
bank account for the deposit of all such funds). 
 103. See id. (eliminating Batasuna’s capacity to contract, negotiate, buy stock, 
receive loans, and make investments). 
 104. See id. at 348 (describing the prohibited activities as demonstrations, marches 
or rallies as well as the display of any form of propaganda such as signs or symbols 
identified with the group). 
 105. See also Pedro de Alzaga, Los problemas de Garzón en Internet [Garzón’s Internet 
Problems], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (Oct. 23, 2002) (noting the difficulties that Garzón 
encountered in impeding Internet access to Batasuna sponsored web pages), 
available at http://www.elpais.es/articulo.html (on file with the American University 
Law Review).  Jurisdictional issues have arisen as the web provider of batasuna.org, 
Blueberry Hills Communications, is incorporated and has its place of business in the 
United States.  Id.  The U.S. company originally blocked access to Batasuna’s web 
page; however, the company’s legal department later advised that Garzón’s order 
could not compel the block.  Lawyers concluded that since the provider was a U.S. 
company and the organization that contracted the site, La Agrupación Electoral Euskal 
Herritarrok [The Basque People’s Electoral Group], maintained its headquarters in 
France, the issue fell within the province of international jurisdiction and was not 
subject to Judge Garzón’s order.  Id. 
 106. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88; DEMANDA PRESENTADA POR EL 
GOBIERNO [GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT] (Sept. 2, 2002) [hereinafter GOVERNMENT’S 
COMPLAINT], at http://www.elmundo.es/documentos/2002/09/demanda.pdf (on 
file with the American University Law Review).   
 107. El Constitucional respalda la Ley de partidos que hará posible la Ilegalización de 
Batasuna [The Constitutional Court Upholds the Law of Political Parties Which Will Facilitate 
Batasuna’s Proscription], EL MUNDO (Madrid), Mar. 14, 2003 [hereinafter The Court 
Upholds the Law of Political Parties] (reporting that the Basque Government filed its 
appeal with the Constitutional Court in September 2002), available at 
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/ 2003/03/12/espana/1047493966.html (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  The Basque Government filed a recurso de 
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The constitutionality of all legislation in Spain falls within the 
province of the Constitutional Court, an autonomous entity 
independent of the judicial branch.108  Questions of constitutionality 
reach the court through any one of five different procedural 
mechanisms,109 one of which is the protective appeal provided for in 
the Law of Political Parties.110  This appeal allows an individual to 
contest the constitutionality of a law that infringes upon a 
fundamental right as defined in the Constitution.111 
The Constitutional Court ultimately rejected the Basque 
Government’s appeal and upheld the constitutionality of the Law of 
Political Parties.112  The Constitutional Court issued its ruling on 
March 13, 2003 allowing the Supreme Court to continue its 
consideration of Batasuna’s proscription.113  Two weeks later, on 
March 27, 2003, the Supreme Court issued its decision resulting in 
the party’s definitive proscription.114  This ruling rendered permanent 
                                                          
inconstitucionalidad [appeal of unconstitutionality] which serves to challenge any 
rules that carry “force of law.”  Id.  See also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 55, at 98 
(explaining the procedural mechanisms that govern the use of the “appeal of 
unconstitutionality”). 
 108. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 95 (noting that the Constitutional 
Court exists as its own jurisdiction and its decisions are based solely on the text of the 
Constitution); VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 129 (explaining that the Constitutional 
Court has jurisdiction over the decisions of the executive and the judiciary and also 
exists to protect the fundamental rights enshrined in the 1978 Constitution). 
 109. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 98-104 (enumerating and describing 
the various mechanisms for challenging the constitutionality of legislative, executive, 
and judicial actions).  For instance, the recurso de inconstitucionalidad [appeal of 
unconstitutionality] allows the Court to review the constitutionality of any rule that 
carries the force of law.  Id. at 98.  The only parties with standing to initiate such an 
appeal are the members of the Congress of Deputies, the Senate, the President, the 
Ombudsman, the Governments of the Autonomous Communities, and the 
Legislative Assemblies of the Communities. Id. at 99.  The cuestión de 
inconstitucionalidad [question of unconstitutionality] is essentially an interlocutory 
appeal of a law’s constitutionality.  Id. at 100.  Any party to a judicial proceeding or 
the judge himself may initiate this appeal.  Id. at 101.  In the case of the conflicto de 
compentencia [conflicts of law], the Constitutional Court may rule on the distribution 
of powers as between the central State and the Autonomous Communities upon 
disagreement regarding which of the two has jurisdiction to decide the question at 
issue.  Id. at 103.  Finally, the Constitutional Court may also hear issues of conflictos de 
atribuciones [conflicts of attributions] which arise when there is some dispute with 
regard to separation of powers.  Id. at 104.  Such a proceeding is actionable only at 
the behest of the Executive, the Congress, the Senate or the General Council of the 
Judiciary.  Id. 
 110. See supra note 73 (describing the relevance of the protective appeal). 
 111. See VILLIERS, supra note 56, at 25 (identifying the fundamental rights subject 
to the protective appeal as those included in Articles 14 through 29 of the 
Constitution); see also MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 102-03 (stating that the court 
will nullify the contested legislation if it finds the law unconstitutional). 
 112. S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003), available at http://www. 
tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 113. Id. 
 114. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13.  The judgment also bans 
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the effects of Judge Garzón’s order and relied on much of the same 
reasoning.115 
After studying the evidence adduced by the Government, the 
Public Prosecutor, and Batasuna, the Supreme Court concluded that 
the party functioned as an extension and under the influence of 
E.T.A.116  In so concluding, the Supreme Court relied in large part on 
Batasuna’s violation of various provisions of Article 9 of the Law of 
Political Parties.  This Article enumerates the actions which, when 
committed in a recurring and egregious manner, will result in 
proscription.  Such activities include systematically jeopardizing 
fundamental rights117 and fomenting, providing, or legitimizing 
violence as a means of achieving political ends.118  It also proscribes 
complementing or supporting a terrorist organization so as to subvert 
the constitutional order and disrupting public order by subjecting 
public officials, particular individuals, or the population in general to 
a climate of terror.119  A party may violate these provisions through 
the commission of any one of a number of proscribed activities 
including: “providing express or tacit support for terrorism,”120 
“accompanying violent action with programs or behavior designed to 
foment an atmosphere of civil confrontation or to deprive others of 
basic liberties (opinion and participation in public affairs) by way of 
coercion, intimidation, etc.,”121 and finally, “the regular inclusion of 
persons convicted of terrorist crimes in the party’s directorate or on 
its electoral ballots.”122 
The Supreme Court lent significant weight to evidence 
demonstrating Batasuna’s legitimization of violence through express 
and tacit political support for the actions of terrorists in pursuit of 
political ends.123  The Supreme Court’s application of this provision 
                                                          
Batasuna’s predecessor parties, H.B. and E.H.  Id. at 197. 
 115. Garzón derived his authority to suspend the party from the Penal Code, 
which provides only for temporary suspensions for investigatory purposes whereas 
the Law of Political Parties vests in the Supreme Court the exclusive power to issue a 
definitive proscription.  C.P. art. 129 (allowing for the temporary suspension of 
allegedly illicit associations); L.O.P.P. art. 11 (reserving the power of proscription for 
the Supreme Court). 
 116. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 18-19. 
 117. L.O.P.P art. 9.2(a). 
 118. Id. art. 9.2(b). 
 119. Id. art. 9.2(c). 
 120. Id. art. 9.3(a). 
 121. Id. art. 9.3(b). 
 122. Id. art. 9.3(c).  The law goes on to provide for six other activities that come 
within the scope of Article 9 proscriptions.  Id. art. 9.3(d)-(i).  As the court’s opinion 
focuses primarily on the first three activities, this Comment confines its analysis to 
those provisions. 
 123. Id. art. 9.2(b) & 9.3(a). 
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closely reflects the analysis of political support for violence that the 
E.C.H.R. conducts in assessing the existence of a “pressing social 
need” for the proscription of a political party.124  This analysis relies 
heavily on the public statements of party leaders evidencing the 
party’s acceptance of violence as a legitimate means of achieving its 
political objective.125 
In further applying the standards established in the Law of Political 
Parties, the Court cited the degree of symbiosis that exists between 
E.T.A. and its political wing.  It noted, in particular, that various 
convicted members of E.T.A. occupy the highest echelons of the 
Batasuna directorate.126  For example, in 1989, the National Court 
convicted Batasuna’s spokesman, Arnaldo Otegi of kidnapping and 
sentenced him to six years in prison.127  Another Batasuna 
parliamentarian, once a candidate for the presidency of the Basque 
Parliament, was convicted for crimes of terrorism in France on 
February 26, 1990 and is currently wanted for involvement in a car 
bombing, with an outstanding warrant for his arrest.128  The Supreme 
Court also noted that currently, four of Batasuna’s seven 
representatives in the Basque Parliament have been convicted of 
crimes of terrorism.129 
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION  
On March 12, 2003, Spain’s Constitutional Court issued a ruling 
that upheld the constitutionality of the Law of Political Parties130 
                                                          
 124. See, e.g., Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 89 
(2002) (holding that while the party employed legitimate means in pursuing its 
political objectives, its allusions to the possibility of the recourse to violence were 
sufficiently flagrant so as to justify its loss of society’s tolerance); Socialist Party v. 
Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 71 (1998) (examining various 
statements of party leaders and concluding that they failed to demonstrate the 
acceptance of violence as a legitimate political method); United Communist Party v. 
Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1998) (considering Communist party leaders’ 
statements calling for a Kurdish nation in holding that those remarks failed to justify 
restrictions on the freedom of association); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 
2567 (1997) (considering the remarks of a politician expressing support for a 
terrorist organization in determining the legitimacy of restrictions placed on his 
freedom of expression). 
 125. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 75-79 (quoting various 
Batasuna members in demonstrating the party’s constructive support for E.T.A’s 
terrorist campaign); see also infra note 193 (examining the statements of various 
Batasuna representatives extolling the use of violence in pursuit of Basque 
independence). 
 126. SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 18. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. S.T.C., Mar. 12, 2003 (No. 48/2003), available at http://www. 
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leaving the E.C.H.R. as the final forum in which to challenge 
Batasuna’s proscription.131  Accordingly, on September 9, 2003, the 
Basque Autonomous Government announced its intention to appeal 
the Constitutional Court’s ruling before the E.C.H.R.132  The Basque 
Government contends that Batasuna’s proscription constitutes a 
violation of Articles 6,133 7,134 and 11135 of the European Convention.136  
The European Convention on Human Rights exists as an 
international, extra-constitutional guarantor of certain fundamental 
rights and its tribunal, the E.C.H.R., serves as a supplementary forum 
in which parties, unsuccessful in domestic courts, may seek redress 
for alleged human rights violations.137  Articles 26 and 27 of the 
Convention set forth the admissibility conditions with which all 
                                                          
tribunalconstitucional.es/JC.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 131. See infra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining E.C.H.R. requisites for 
the appeal of domestic judicial rulings). 
 132. Batasuna’s Defense, supra note 16 (noting that the Constitutional Court 
decided by unanimous vote to uphold the law). 
 133. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 6 (enshrining the right to a fair and public trial). 
 134. Id. art. 7.  Article 7 reads in pertinent part: 
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a criminal offense under national or 
international law at the time when it was committed.  Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal 
offense was committed. 
Id. 
 135. Id. art. 11.  Article 11 reads as follows: 
Article 11 - Freedom of Assembly and Association 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, . . .  
 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other 
than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of 
these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
Id. 
 136. SERVICIO ANALÍTICO-INFORMATIVO DE LA RED VASCA ROJA, LA “DEMOCRACIA” 
ESPAÑOLA JIBARIZADA:  LA “HISTÓRICA” SESIÓN DEL ESPAÑOL CONGRESO DE LOS 
DIPUTADOS QUE ACTIVÓ LA INCONSTITUCIONAL LEY DE PARTIDOS PARA ILEGALIZAR A 
BATASUNA [ANALYTICAL-INFORMATIVE SERVICE OF THE RED BASQUE NET, SPANISH 
DEMOCRACY “JIBARIZADA”:  THE “HISTORIC” SESSION OF THE SPANISH CONGRESS OF 
DEPUTIES THAT PROMULGATED THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAW TO BAN BATASUNA] 
[hereinafter SPANISH DEMOCRACY] (examining ways in which the Law of Political 
Parties violates the rights of expression and association protected by the Spanish 
Constitution), at http://www.basque-red.net/cas/oculto/ejemplo/ag2002/ag028. 
html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  
This Comment confines its analysis to the law’s conformity with Article 11 as it relates 
to the freedom of association and political proscription. 
 137. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 101 (explaining the system of appeals 
and stating that individuals may appeal determinations of constitutionality affecting 
fundamental rights before the E.C.H.R.). 
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claims must comply.138  The most salient provision states that in order 
for the E.C.H.R. to consider a complaint, the complaining party must 
have exhausted all domestic remedies139 and must have submitted the 
application within six months from the date of the issuance of the 
national decision.140  As the Law of Political Parties provides only for 
protective appeal before the Constitutional Court, that court’s recent 
decision upholding the constitutionality of the law represents an 
exhaustion of local remedies.141  Consequently, the E.C.H.R. 
represents the final forum in which to challenge the proscription of 
Batasuna.142 
A. Domestic Applicability of the European Convention 
Pursuant to the doctrine of incorporation, all international treaties 
to which Spain is a signatory, upon ratification, automatically form 
part of domestic law.143  Spain subscribes to the monist school of 
incorporation, which provides for automatic incorporation of 
international rules with no further legislative action necessary to 
confer binding authority upon an international agreement.144  The 
Spanish Constitution identifies three distinct varieties of treaties.145  
Among those, Article 93 treaties confer some of the powers of the 
State upon an international organization.146  In order to assume force 
of law, such treaties require the passage of a Ley Orgánica [Organic 
                                                          
 138. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 67 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining the process by which 
claims arrive at the E.C.H.R.). 
 139. Eur. Conv. on H.R. arts. 26 & 27; see VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 
89 (defining exhaustion of domestic remedies as the employment of all “remedies 
provided for up to the highest level only if and in so far as the appeal to a higher 
tribunal can still substantially affect the decision on the merits”). 
 140. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 26; VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 98. 
 141. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 101-02 (stating that the protective 
appeal is the last internal appeal available to a citizen contesting the alleged 
infringement upon a fundamental right or freedom). 
 142. See id. (explaining the system of appeals and stating that individuals may 
appeal determinations of constitutionality affecting fundamental rights before the 
E.C.H.R.). 
 143. Id. at 33 (noting that Article 96 of the Spanish Constitution expressly 
provides for the incorporation of valid treaties into the domestic legal system). 
 144. Id.  The monist system, largely favored in Continental tradition, is in 
juxtaposition with the dualist system employed in England.  Id. at 33 n.27.  The 
dualist system necessitates legislative action in order to confer binding authority 
upon international treaties. VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 138, at 11-12. 
 145. See MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33 (describing the three types of 
treaties as:  Article 93 treaties which give some state power to an international 
organization; treaties that require prior authorization by Parliament; and finally, any 
other treaty that does not fall into the previously described categories). 
 146. C.E. art. 93; MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33. 
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Law] authorizing their signature.147  The Treaty of the Accession of 
Spain to the European Union148 is exemplary of such a treaty.149 
Upon the passage of the requisite Organic Law, any subsequent 
legislation that the European Union passes becomes binding in Spain 
without any action on the part of domestic institutions.150  The 
Supreme Court of Spain has confirmed that “European Community 
Law has direct effect and supremacy over national law by virtue of the 
partial cession of sovereignty brought about by the accession to the 
European Community.”151  Similarly, the Constitutional Court has 
stated that “the binding force of Community Law emanates from the 
Accession Treaty according to Article 93 of the Spanish 
Constitution.”152  Consequently, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, to which Spain is a signatory, carries with it the force of 
domestic law and accordingly governs all domestic legislative and 
judicial pronouncements. 
B. E.C.H.R. Jurisprudence Regarding Political Proscription and the 
Freedom of Association 
The E.C.H.R. has had frequent occasion to consider the issue of 
political proscription.  Both the case of Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) v. 
Turkey153 and the case of Socialist Party v. Turkey,154 in addition to other 
recent decisions, exemplify recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence regarding 
the proscription of political parties.  Those decisions provide a useful 
paradigm through which to examine and evaluate the potential fate 
of the ban on Batasuna.155 
In interpreting Article 11, specifically in the context of political 
proscription, the E.C.H.R. has established a tripartite test that 
governs its analysis.  The E.C.H.R.’s Article 11 jurisprudence 
establishes that, in order to comply with the Convention, restrictions 
                                                          
 147. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 33. 
 148. Id. at 34. 
 149. See id. (citing a Constitutional Court decision which provided that “the 
binding force of Community Law comes from the Accession Treaty according to 
Article 93 of the Spanish Constitution”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. MERINO-BLANCO, supra note 58, at 36 (internal quotations omitted). 
 152. Id. at 34. 
 153. App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (2002). 
 154. App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1998). 
 155. Compare Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 56 (finding no violation of Article 
11), with Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 51 (holding that the dissolution of the 
Socialist Party violated provisions of Article 11), and United Communist Party v. 
Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28 (1998) (holding that the dissolution of the Communist 
Party constituted an Article 11 violation).  The Socialist and Communist Party cases 
prove particularly instructive in the case of Batasuna as they also address the 
dissolution of political parties associated with terrorist separatist organizations. 
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on the freedoms of association must be:  (1) “prescribed by law,” 
(2) directed at one or more “legitimate aims,” and (3) be “necessary 
in a domestic society” in order to achieve those aims.156 
The first element, prescription by law, requires that relevant 
domestic law provide for the dissolution of a political party.157  With 
regard to the second element, Article 11 enumerates various interests 
that will satisfy the “legitimate aim” inquiry.158  The European Court 
regards as legitimate, those actions taken to ensure national security 
or public safety, to prevent disorder or crime, and to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.159  Finally, with regard to the third 
element, “necessary in a democratic society,” the E.C.H.R. routinely 
lends primacy to this factor160 and has established several general 
principles that govern its analysis. 
The E.C.H.R. defines “necessary in a democratic society” as those 
measures that meet a “pressing social need.”161  It has expressly 
limited its role in such an inquiry to that of determining whether the 
relevant national authority has employed a means “‘proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the 
national authority to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient.’”162  In 
                                                          
 156.   See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76 (applying the tripartite test in 
holding that the dissolution of the Welfare Party did not violate Article 11); Socialist 
Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81 (applying the tripartite test in finding that Turkey’s 
dissolution of the Socialist party resulted in a violation of Article 11).  In Socialist 
Party, the European Court noted that it generally conflates its analyses of Articles 10 
and 11 as Article 11 violations must be “considered in light of Article 10 [as] the 
protection of opinions and the freedom to express them is one of the objectives of 
the freedoms of assembly and association as enshrined in Article 11.”  Id. at 83. 
 157. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 76 (concluding that a constitutional 
provision or similar statutory provision will constitute a prescription by law); Socialist 
Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81 (holding that various articles of both the 
Constitution and domestic law satisfied the prescription by law element); United 
Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18 (holding that statutory and constitutional 
provisions satisfied the inquiry as to prescription by law). 
 158. Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 11 (identifying as legitimate aims, the preservation 
“of national security or public safety,” “the prevention of disorder or crime,” or “the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 (finding unanimity among the 
parties as to the first two criteria and establishing the third element as outcome 
determinative); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 (holding that the restriction 
failed Article 11 scrutiny due to its failure to satisfy the court’s pressing social need 
inquiry); United Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 28 (noting that the dissolution of 
the Communist party similarly failed to comply with Article 11 due to its 
inconsistency with the third prong of the test); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 
2547 (1997) (finding that interference complied with all three prongs of the Article 
10 test). 
 161. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80 (finding that Turkey’s dissolution of 
the Welfare Party met a “pressing social need” in light of the party’s intention of 
establishing a plurality of legal systems and its tacit support of political violence). 
 162. See id. (ruling that the nature and severity of the restriction imposed are 
factors in the calculus of proportionality and deeming the measures adopted in Refah 
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doing so, the E.C.H.R. must find that national authorities applied a 
standard consonant with Article 11 and that “they based their 
decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts.”163 
Specifically with regard to restrictions on the activities of political 
parties, the E.C.H.R. expressly noted that states are not free to place 
restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of a political party simply 
because they disagree with its message.164  The E.C.H.R. has, however, 
tempered the scrutiny to which it subjects alleged Article 11 violations 
with several limitations regarding the activities of political parties.165  
For example, it explicitly eschewed the employment of any means 
other than democracy to achieve political ends.166  The European 
Court elaborated with the admonition that “a political party whose 
leaders incite recourse to violence, or propose a policy which does 
not comply with [the] rules of democracy . . . cannot lay claim to the 
protection of the Convention against penalties imposed for those 
reasons.”167  Accordingly, the E.C.H.R. has held that, on occasion, the 
exercise of a fundamental right may be subordinated in the interest 
of maintaining order and public safety and protecting the 
fundamental rights of other citizens.168 
Recognizing the unique difficulties associated with the fight against 
terrorism, the E.C.H.R. also takes into account the historical 
predicate of any case before it.169  In one such case, it stated that 
                                                          
Partisi to be both relevant and sufficient). 
 163. See id. (establishing the general principles that govern the court’s analysis of 
alleged Article 11 violations). 
 164. See United Communist Party, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27 (holding that there is no 
justification for restricting the rights of a political party “solely because it seeks to 
debate in public the situation of part of the State’s population and to take part in the 
nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions 
capable of satisfying everyone concerned.”). 
 165. See generally Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 56 (upholding dissolution of 
the Welfare Party). 
 166. Id. at 78.  This case articulates the rule regarding political activity such that a 
political party may campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional 
basis of the State on two conditions:  (1) the means used to that end must in every 
respect be legal and democratic; and (2) the change proposed must itself be 
compatible with fundamental democratic principles.  Id. 
 167. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 78-79 (stating that no person may take 
umbrage in provisions of the Convention in order to perform acts aimed at 
destroying those same rights and freedoms as they apply to others).  Such definitive 
prohibitions apply with notable force to the case of Batasuna as its connections to 
E.T.A. illustrate the role that it has played in depriving the Spanish population of 
fundamental rights that Batasuna now claims that the government has violated.  See 
infra note 226 (elaborating on the ways in which the Batasuna/E.T.A. alliance has 
violated the rights of the Basque citizenry). 
 168. Id.; see Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 15, 
2001) (holding that freedom of religion could be restricted in the interest of a 
neutral public education service). 
 169. See, e.g., United Communist Party v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 26-27 (1998) 
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political freedoms are not absolute and that “in a democratic society, 
it is of cardinal importance for the authorities to fulfill their duties to 
wage a relentless and unremitting battle against terrorism.”170 
The applicant in Refah Partisi171 was a political party properly 
registered under Turkish law.172  Following the 1995 elections, it 
                                                          
(considering the climate of internal discord that characterized the nationalist 
struggle between the Turks and the Kurds). In a similar vein, in Refah Partisi, the 
Court considered the role and the history of political proscription in Western 
European nations and examined the notion of “militant democracy.”  See 35 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 83 (examining the evolution of political proscription and its role in the 
constitutional development of Western totalitarian states).  The concept of a militant 
democracy was borne of the experiences of Germany and Italy in their struggles with 
fascism and national-socialism, movements which came to power after free elections.  
See id. (defining a militant democracy as “a democratic system which defended itself 
against all political movements which sought to destroy it”).  Such a notion finds 
particular resonance in the case of Spain, which likewise freed itself from the yoke of 
fascism upon the death of Franco in 1975.  See JIMÉNEZ, supra note 14, at 386 (noting 
the precarious political situation that characterized the period between the death of 
Franco and the eventual achievement of democratic stability).  In response to these 
new threats, “the concept of militant democracy and the possibility of repressing 
political groups which abused the freedoms of association and expression were set 
forth in the Constitutions of European States,” illustrating that many Western 
democracies not only accept the practice but recognize it as an invaluable means of 
combating the threats that radical political factions pose to democracy.  See Ami 
Pedahzur, Struggling Challenges of Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism within 
Democratic Boundaries:  A Comparative Analysis 20 (Apr. 2001) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the American University Law Review) (contextualizing the 
employment of political proscription as a response to the abuse of newly conferred 
freedoms by radical parties in post-dictatorship periods), available at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk; see also John Finn, Electoral Regimes and the Proscription of Anti-
Democratic Parties, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 70-74 
(David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg eds., 2001) (indicating that Australia, 
Chile, France, Germany, Israel, and Italy, among others, have either constitutional or 
legislative provisions that allow for the proscription of political parties).  Finn also 
notes that the European Convention explicitly provides for such proscriptions.  Id. at 
71.  The European Parliament also affirmed this practice in its resolution of 
December 10, 1996 on the constitutional status of European political parties.  
According to the resolution, the program and activities of political parties must 
respect democracy, human rights, and the fundamental constitutional principles of 
the rule of law enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union. Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 74. 
 170. Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2548 (1997).  The Commission stated 
in its opinion: 
[W]here in such a society, political violence is a permanent threat to the life 
and safety of the population, and where support for that violence is 
expressed through the media, it is imperative to strike a fair balance between 
the right to freedom of expression and the legitimate right of the 
community to protect itself against the activities of armed groups whose 
avowed or concealed aim is to overthrow the democratic system which is the 
guarantee of human rights. 
Id. at 2568.  This statement, in the context of an alleged violation of Article 10 
assumes importance in the instant case as the court has stated that Article 11 
violations must be considered in light of the provisions contained in Article 10. See 
supra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the joint application of Articles 10 
and 11). 
 171. App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (2002). 
 172. See id. at 63 (noting that the party was founded in July 18, 1983). 
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existed as the largest political party in the Turkish parliament.173  In 
May of 1997, the Principal State Counsel applied to the Turkish 
Constitutional Court to dissolve the Welfare Party on the grounds 
that its activities and central tenets contravened principles of 
secularism.174 
The Constitutional Court, in holding that activities incompatible 
with the rule of law were impermissible, cited various provisions of 
domestic legislation obliging political parties to abide by the 
principle of secularism.175  Of special significance in the 
Constitutional Court’s analysis was Turkey’s experience with religious 
discord and the fact that secularism was consequently enshrined in 
the Constitution as a pillar of the Turkish State.176  The Constitutional 
Court ultimately found that the government’s actions to maintain a 
secular state were required to preserve the principles of democracy.177  
The Turkish Court ordered the immediate and permanent 
dissolution of the Welfare Party, transferred its assets to the State 
Treasury, and banned five of its Members of Parliament from 
participating in any political party for five years.178 
The applicants subsequently appealed the Constitutional Court’s 
ruling before the E.C.H.R.  They alleged that the order dissolving the 
Welfare Party and prohibiting its leaders from holding office in that 
party or in any other political party constituted an interference with 
their right to freedom of association in violation of Article 11 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.179 
                                                          
 173. See id. (claiming 158 of the 450 total seats in the Turkish parliament following 
the 1995 election). 
 174. See id. (noting that the application reflected that the Welfare Party’s leaders 
promoted the concept of jihad in advocating for the abolition of secularism in 
Turkey). 
 175. See id. at 66 (stating that the Constitutional Court based its ruling on Turkish 
Law No. 2820 on regulation of political parties).  The domestic law provides for the 
dissolution of political parties that “jeopardize the existence of the Turkish State and 
Republic, abolish fundamental rights and freedoms, [or] introduce discrimination 
on grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of a religious 
sect . . . .”  Id. at 74.  The law vests authority in the Constitutional Court to dissolve a 
party if it finds that it is operating contrary to the above provision. Id. at 75. 
 176. Id. at 67. 
 177. See id. at 83 (resting its decision largely on remarks of Welfare Party leaders 
indicating that the party “had an actively aggressive and belligerent attitude to the 
established order’ and was making ‘a concerted attempt to prevent it from 
functioning properly”) (internal quotations omitted).  The Government had argued 
that such speeches existed as calls for popular insurgency in order to bring about the 
demise of the existing political order and thus the dissolution of the Welfare Party 
served the “pressing need” of the preservation of democracy.  Id. at 83-84. 
 178. See id. at 72 (concluding that the offending Members of Parliament were 
responsible for the Welfare Party’s dissolution by virtue of the radical threat to 
democracy that they posed as evidenced in various statements and speeches). 
 179. See id. at 81 (refuting the government’s claim that the Welfare Party  militated 
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The E.C.H.R., applying its tripartite test, agreed with the 
Constitutional Court and upheld the dissolution.180  With regard to 
the first criterion, all parties stipulated that the dissolution was 
prescribed by law as both the Turkish Constitution and Law 2820 on 
the regulation of political parties provided for proscription.181  The 
E.C.H.R. further held that, in preserving secularism, the Welfare 
Party’s dissolution served the interests of protecting national security, 
public safety, and the rights and freedoms of others.182 
Finally, the E.C.H.R. held that the party’s proscription was 
necessary in a democratic society and hinged its ruling on three 
grounds for dissolution:  the Welfare Party’s advocation of a 
pluralistic legal system, its intent to institute the law of sharia,183 and 
finally, remarks of party members advocating jihad as a legitimate 
political method.184  The E.C.H.R. based its ruling largely on the facts 
that the Welfare Party declared its intention of setting up a plurality 
of legal systems and had “adopted an ambiguous stance with regard 
to the use of force to gain power and retain it.”185  In concluding that 
the dissolution did not violate Article 11 of the European 
Convention, the E.C.H.R. declared that, “a State may reasonably 
forestall the execution of such a policy, which is incompatible with 
the Convention’s provisions, before an attempt is made to implement 
it through concrete steps that might prejudice civil peace and the 
country’s democratic regime.”186 
The E.C.H.R. upheld the first justification for dissolution, stating 
that a plurality of legal systems in the same nation would be 
inconsistent with the Convention system.187  It explained that such a 
model would not only preclude the State from exercising its role as a 
“guarantor of individual rights and freedoms,” but would also result 
                                                          
for the abandonment or destruction of existing Turkish constitutional order and 
asserting that the government had violated freedom of expression in barring 
parliament members from political participation). 
 180. See id. at 76-77 (requiring that the dissolution of a political party be 
“prescribed by law,” executed in pursuit of a “legitimate aim,” and “necessary in a 
democratic society”). 
 181. See id. at 76 (establishing that a constitutional provision permitting the 
dissolution of a political party will satisfy the “prescribed by law” requirement). 
 182. See id. at 76-78 (concluding, in agreement with the Constitutional Court, that 
the preservation of secularism was necessary in order to protect national security, 
public safety, the rights and freedoms of others, and to prevent disorder or crime). 
 183. See id. at 86 (defining sharia as Islamic law). 
 184. See id. at 84 (dividing all arguments put forward by the Principal State 
Counsel and those the Constitutional Court cited into three categories). 
 185. Id. at 91. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See id. at 85-86 (noting that the State bears the obligation of procuring and 
applying laws uniformly with regard to all citizens). 
SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/3/2003  11:47 AM 
2003] SPAIN’S PROSCRIPTION OF BATASUNA 1561 
in an inherently unequal legal treatment of individuals.188  The 
E.C.H.R. noted that the creation of a pluralistic legal system based on 
religion would import a disparity in the treatment, legal and 
otherwise, of Turkish citizens according to their religions.189 
The final and most compelling consideration in the E.C.H.R.’s 
analysis is characteristic of all of its Article 11 jurisprudence.190  In all 
of these cases, the E.C.H.R. lent significance to the party’s tacit 
support for violence as a political method as evidenced in the 
remarks of its members and directorate.191 
For example, in Refah Partisi, the E.C.H.R. upheld proscription of 
the Welfare Party, and in Zana,192 it affirmed the conviction of a 
political leader for statements that he made in support of a separatist 
terrorist organization.  In both cases the E.C.H.R. took special notice 
of remarks in which party leaders espoused the use of force as a 
means by which to reach political ends.  It also lent probative weight 
to the fact that those leaders failed to take affirmative steps to 
distance themselves from the factions within their parties that had 
extolled the virtue of armed struggle against politicians who opposed 
them.193 
                                                          
 188. See id. (condemning the creation of a pluralistic legal system as incompatible 
with the European Convention).  It is worth noting that the lehendakari [president] of 
the Basque Country presented a plan for shared sovereignty over the autonomous 
community.  Ibarretxe plantea una soberanía compartida entre País Vasco y España 
[Ibarretexe Proposes a Shared Sovereignty Between the Basque Country and Spain], ABC 
(Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.abc.es/Nacional/noticia.asp?id= 
132180&dia=hoy (reporting that Ibarretxe also suggested that the Basque Country 
should enjoy direct participation in European institutions).  The European 
Commission unanimously rejected the plan as incompatible with the existing 
framework of the European Union. See Ibarretxe’s Plan, supra note 34 (declaring that 
there is no judicial basis for Ibarretxe’s initiative). 
 189. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 85-86 
(2002) (warning that such distinctions would undermine legislative and judicial 
unity). 
 190. See id. at 89 (noting that while the party employed legitimate means in 
pursuing its political objectives, its allusions to the possibility of the recourse to 
violence were sufficiently flagrant so as to justify its loss of society’s tolerance); 
Socialist Party v. Turkey, App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 71 (1998) 
(examining the statements of party leaders that allegedly reflected their acceptance 
of violence as a legitimate political method); United Communist Party v. Turkey, 62 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 27 (1998) (considering Communist party leaders’ statements calling 
for a Kurdish nation in holding that those remarks failed to justify restrictions on the 
freedom of association); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2567 (1997) 
(considering the remarks of a politician expressing support for a terrorist 
organization in determining whether restricting his freedom of expression met a 
“pressing social need”). 
 191. See infra note 193 (exploring the role of public statements in the Court’s 
evaluation of the existence of a pressing social need). 
 192. 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2534, 2549 (regarding the comments that the leader made 
in support of the PKK as likely to exacerbate an “explosive situation” and concluding 
that the interference with the freedom of expression served a “pressing social need”). 
 193. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 83 (noting that the Turkish 
SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/3/2003  11:47 AM 
1562 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1531 
The E.C.H.R. cited statements of various party members as support 
for its findings regarding proscription and a pressing social need.  In 
                                                          
Constitutional Court identified speeches made by Welfare Party leaders 
demonstrating “an actively aggressive and belligerent attitude to the established 
order” and making “a concerted attempt to prevent it from functioning properly” as 
grounds for dissolution); see also Zana, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2567 (stating that in 
describing acts of terrorism as a “national liberation struggle,” the applicant not only 
failed to dissociate himself from such acts, but implicitly justified them). 
In Refah Partisi, the Constitutional Court found that the offending speeches 
constituted a call for public uprising and the use of force, that the proscription of the 
party represented a preventative measure for the protection of democracy which, for 
the purposes of the E.C.H.R.’s analysis, constituted a “pressing social need.”  35 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. at 83.  In its analysis, the Court gave special consideration to remarks of 
several Welfare Party Members of Parliament.  Id. at 88.  “We shall certainly call to 
account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who 
deprive Allah’s messenger of his jurisdiction in their country.”  Id. at 69.  The court 
quoted one Member of Parliament as proclaiming, “Our homeland belongs to us, 
but not the regime.”  Id. at 70.  Another member avowed, “[i]f you attempt to close 
down the . . . theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood 
will flow . . . .  That’s how democracy will be installed.”  Id. at 71. 
While the court conceded that government documents contained no explicit calls 
for the use of force, it lent probative weight to the failure of Welfare Party leaders to 
take “prompt practical steps to distance themselves from” the factions within the 
party who had made such calls for violent insurgency.  Id. at 88.  See Zana, 57 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. at 2549 (finding no violation of Article 10’s freedom of expression where 
Turkey imposed criminal sanctions based on the applicant’s statements in support of 
a separatist organization).  The court again lent compelling weight to the conclusion 
of the Commission in its finding that, in failing to dissociate himself from acts of 
terrorism, the applicant had implicitly justified and propagated them.  Id.  In this 
case, the Court also noted the relevance of the fact that the applicant made the 
remarks on the same day that PKK militants killed a number of civilians resulting in 
an atmosphere of “extreme tension.”  Id. 
Similarly, the Spanish Government pointed out that Batasuna was the only political 
party that failed to sign on to a multi-lateral condemnation of recent E.T.A. attacks 
that resulted in the deaths of a six-year-old girl and a fifty-seven-year-old man at a 
popular beach resort in Santa Pola, Alicante.  PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 
88, at 12.  Not only did Batasuna fail to condemn the terrorist attack but one of its 
representatives, Antton Morcillo, affirmed that the failure to condemn acts of E.T.A. 
was a sign of Batasuna’s political identity and further that “the events in Santa Pola 
are the result of the situation of perpetual conflict that one lives with in Euskal 
Herria.”  Id. at 14. 
The Public Prosecutor’s complaint is replete with similar statements manifesting 
Batasuna’s support for E.T.A.’s bloody enterprise.  On August 11, 2002, at a rally in 
San Sebastian, the Batasuna directorate was involved in cheers supporting E.T.A:  
“gora E.T.A. militarra” [long live E.T.A.].  Id. at 16.  At the closure of the rally, a 
member of Batasuna’s National Cabinet addressed the crowd promising that “if 
Aznar wants a war, the abertzale [left] and all of Euskal Herria will respond with war;” 
and continued, proclaiming “when all doors to agreement are closed before the 
people, it has only one recourse, death or independence.  Independence or death is 
our mantra.”  Id. at 16. 
The complaint also contained the transcript of statements that Arnaldo Otegi, 
spokesman for Batasuna, delivered at a press conference regarding Garzón’s order. 
Id. at 19.  It quoted Otegi as saying, “Don’t even think, and we ask this with absolute 
humility but with rotundity, about using the mechanisms [referring to the Ertzaintza] 
at your disposal, to collaborate with the strategy of annihilating the left [Batasuna-
E.H.-H.B.], don’t even think about collaboration with the Spanish State’s strategy of 
genocide.” Id. at 19.  Otegi concluded warning the Basque Government to “disobey 
the State [or] assume the consequences.”  Id. at 19-20. 
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Zana, the E.C.H.R. examined the statements of a political leader in 
which he expressed his solidarity with a terrorist organization, the 
PKK, at a time that coincided with a deadly attack that resulted in the 
deaths of various civilians.194  It concluded that in such a case, the 
penalty imposed could reasonably be regarded as serving a pressing 
social need.195 
Also, the European Court in Refah Partisi cited one leader as stating 
that “the question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will 
be violent or peaceful . . . will it be achieved harmoniously or by 
bloodshed.”196  Another stated that those who opposed the party 
would suffer the “calamity [of] the renegades they will have to 
face.”197  The E.C.H.R. further noted that the remarks of one of the 
Welfare Party’s parliament members revealed deep hatred for those 
he considered to be opponents of an Islamist regime.198  The court 
concluded that “where the offending conduct reaches a high level of 
insult and comes close to a negation of the freedom of religion of 
others it loses the right to society’s tolerance.”199 
Upon deciding that the dissolution of the Welfare Party met a 
pressing social need, the E.C.H.R. addressed the issue of 
proportionality, stating that the nature and severity of the 
interference are also factors to be weighed in its assessment.200  In 
doing so, it noted that despite the exclusion of five party members 
from political activity, the Party’s remaining 152 members of 
parliament continued in their parliamentary capacities, and also that 
the Welfare Party at no time alleged pecuniary damage based on the 
transfer of assets to the Treasury.201 
The E.C.H.R. ultimately held that the interference was not 
disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued in light of the fact 
that it “answered a pressing social need.”202  It further held “that the 
                                                          
 194. See Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2549 (1997) (lending significance 
to the fact that Zana made the statements at issue in an atmosphere charged with 
social tension in the wake of a terrorist attack). 
 195. See id. (noting the significance of the leader’s role as a public figure and the 
publication of his statements in a national publication as further support for 
government’s need to diffuse a potentially volatile situation). 
 196. See id. at 68. 
 197. Id. at 70. 
 198. 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 89 (including statements of party leaders tending to 
show that the Welfare Party extolled violence as a legitimate means to its political 
end). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. at 90 (stating that excessive state intervention would not be a 
permissible means to protect the social need). 
 201. See id. at 91 (describing how the Welfare Party was still a viable political force 
despite the government crackdown). 
 202. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
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grounds cited by the Constitutional Court to justify the Welfare 
Party’s dissolution and the temporary forfeiture of certain political 
rights by the other applicants were relevant and sufficient.”203  
Accordingly, the E.C.H.R. concluded that the Welfare Party’s 
proscription did not violate Article 11.204 
Only three years earlier, in Socialist Party, the E.C.H.R. employed a 
similar analysis in reaching an opposite conclusion holding that 
Turkey’s dissolution of the Socialist Party constituted a violation of 
Article 11.205  In dissolving the Socialist Party, the Turkish 
Constitutional Court provided two justifications for its decision.  
According to the government, the Socialist Party promoted the 
establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish federation thus undermining the 
national unity and threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish 
State.206  The government also likened the Socialist Party to a terrorist 
organization and claimed that it was incompatible with Articles 11 
and 17 of the Convention.207 
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court dissolved the Socialist Party, 
liquidated its assets, and transferred them to the Treasury.208  
Additionally, the Constitutional Court’s order banned the party’s 
founders and managers from holding office in any other political 
party.209 
The Socialist Party argued that it had always defended the integrity 
of the Turkish State and denied the proposal of any solution to the 
Kurdish problem that would preclude such State unity.210  The 
Socialist Party also asserted that the federal system that it supported 
would promote the peaceful coexistence of Turks and Kurds thus 
safeguarding the integrity of the Turkish Republic.211 
Conversely, the government argued that the Socialist Party had 
begun to espouse a progressively more overt policy of separatism.212  It 
asserted that, in invoking a Kurdish right to self-determination, the 
                                                          
 203. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 204. Id. 
 205. App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51 (1998). 
 206. See id. at 61 (foreclosing the feasibility of the existence of two nations within 
the Republic of Turkey regardless of the ethnic origin of its citizens). 
 207. See id. (stating that despite a difference in means employed, “objectives 
which . . . encouraged separatism and incited a socially integrated community to 
fight for the creation of an independent federated State were unacceptable”). 
 208. See id. at 60 (noting that, despite liquidation of their assets, the Socialist Party 
never suffered any financial injury). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 68. 
 211. Id. (noting that a federation, and not a confederation, would protect Kurdish 
interests while simultaneously maintaining the unity of the Turkish state). 
 212. Id. (stating the government’s concern about growing separatist movements 
among Kurdish groups). 
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Socialist Party was attempting to polarize the population into ethnic 
minorities and majorities, in contravention of the principle of 
national unity.213  It rested its claim on speeches of the Party’s 
chairman in which he allegedly sought to vindicate the use of 
violence and terrorist methods calling for insurgency aimed at the 
establishment of a separate state within Turkish territory.214 
On appeal before the E.C.H.R., all parties stipulated to the 
prescription by law of the dissolution.  The E.C.H.R. further 
determined that the prohibition of activity that could jeopardize the 
territorial integrity of the Turkish State constituted a protection of 
national security and thus a “legitimate aim” within the meaning of 
Article 11.215 
The E.C.H.R. concluded, however, that the dissolution of the 
political party was not necessary in a democratic society.216  In 
reaching this determination, the E.C.H.R. again examined statements 
of party leaders finding that the Socialist Party and its chairman had 
employed pacific and lawful political means to achieve their 
objective.217  The E.C.H.R. deferred in large part to the findings of the 
                                                          
 213. Id. at 69 (claiming that “[t]he concept of national unity is based on equal 
rights for all citizens without distinction.”). 
 214. Id. at 58 (including oral statements of the party’s chairman invoking the 
expression “Ayaga kalk” [stand up] as evidence of inciting political violence).  In 
order to evidence the violent policy of the Socialist Party, the government proffered 
extracts from its publications and various statements of its chairman. Id. at 55-59.  
Excerpts from Socialist Party publications make consistent reference to the assertion 
of Kurdish rights including statements such as “[t]he second dynamic is the Kurdish 
dynamic.  It is the call for equality and freedom, [it is] the Kurds’ claim to rights as a 
nation.”  Id. at 55.  Statements from the Socialist Party chairman include the 
following remarks that he made at a public meeting in calling for the Kurdish people 
to unite in asserting their right to self-determination: 
The Kurdish and Turkish nations should have the same rights.  The Kurdish 
and Turkish nations will form a popular republic . . . .  It is the Socialist Party 
that is with the oppressed Kurdish people . . . .  By standing up, the Kurdish 
people have begun to demonstrate the combat they have been waging for 
years . . . .  The Kurdish people will bring about a new revolution . . . .  The 
oppressed Kurdish people . . . are coming to join the Socialist Party . . . .  
Long live the awakening!  Long live our people! 
Id. at 59. 
 215. Id. at 80-81. 
 216. Id. at 84-85. 
 217. See id. at 83 (noting that “the publications did not contain anything intended 
to encourage extremist or terrorist groups to destroy the constitutional order of the 
State or to found a Kurdish State through the use of force.”).  The court noted with 
regard to the chairman’s statements, that Article 10 freedom of expression 
necessarily informs all Article 11 analysis.  Id.  It stated that such protections extend 
not only to ideas “favourably received . . . but also to those that offend, shock or 
disturb.”  Id.  In finding that nothing in the chairman’s statements alluded to his 
condoning or promoting the use of violence, the court found that he had in reality 
spoken out against “the former culture idolising [sic] violence and advocating the 
use of force to solve problems between nations and in society . . . .”  Id. at 57.  The 
court declined to find any infringement on the rules of democracy and failed to 
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Commission in holding that the restriction in question was radical:  
the government had dissolved the party with immediate and 
permanent effect, liquidated its assets, and banned its leaders from 
engaging in political activity.218  The E.C.H.R. stated that while it 
would take into account the background of the cases before it, 
particularly the difficulties associated with the prevention of 
terrorism, in this case it found no reason to doubt the Socialist Party’s 
compliance with democratic practices.219  In support of its finding the 
E.C.H.R. noted, as evidenced in various speeches, that the Socialist 
Party had no immediate intention of undermining the national 
integrity of the Turkish State.220  It concluded that the government 
had failed to prove that the statements upon which it based its case 
demonstrated the Socialist Party’s espousal of violence as a political 
method or were in any way responsible for the terrorist threat in 
Turkey.221 
C. Consonance of Spanish Measures with the E.C.H.R.’s Article 11 
Jurisprudence 
Pursuant to its Article 11 jurisprudence, the E.C.H.R. will likely 
uphold the proscription of Batasuna.  In the instant case, the first 
element of prescription by law will not prove problematic as the Law 
of Political Parties provides expressly for the dissolution of political 
parties as do Article 22 of the Constitution222 and Article 129 of the 
Spanish Penal Code.223 
                                                          
distinguish such statements from those that political groups in other European 
countries had made.  Id. at 85. 
 218. Id. at 60. 
 219. See id. at 86 (noting the relevance of a nation’s history with terrorism in 
construing the threat that a particular party poses to the security of that nation). 
 220. See id. at 87 (finding no relationship between the statements of party leaders 
and the terrorist threat in Turkey). 
 221. Id. at 86-87 (emphasizing that the fact that a political platform is at odds with 
an existing political structure is not a threat, per se, to the institution of democracy.)  
The court noted that, despite references to a Kurdish right to secede, the statements 
at issue, when read in context, did not advocate for secession as much as they 
militated for the establishment of a federal state pursuant to a popular referendum.  
Id. at 71. 
 222. While the Constitution explicitly refers only to the dissolution of associations, 
the Spanish Constitutional Court has determined that political parties constitute 
associations for the purposes of Article 22.  S.T.C. 85/1986. 
 223. See C.E. art. 22 (providing for the dissolution or suspension of an association 
only by means of a resolution from the appropriate judicial entity); see also C.P. arts. 
129 & 520 (vesting in the judiciary the authority to dissolve an illicit association and 
close its businesses, offices and establishments for a period not to exceed five years).  
Article 515 of the Penal Code defines “illicit” associations, inter alia, as terrorist 
organizations, those that have as their objective the commission of a crime, and those 
that promote discrimination, hate or violence against persons, groups or associations 
based on ideology, race, ethnicity, nationality or religion or beliefs.  C.P. art. 515. 
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The E.C.H.R. will also likely find that Spain’s ban on Batasuna 
served a legitimate aim.  In both Turkish cases, the court held that at 
least one of the State’s aims was legitimate.224  With regard to the 
proscription of the Socialist Party, the E.C.H.R. determined that the 
protection of territorial integrity furthered the interest of national 
security and thus constituted a legitimate aim.225  Similarly, Spain’s 
actions against Batasuna were not only in the interests of national 
security and territorial integrity but also were necessary to ensure 
public safety and protect the rights and freedoms of others, all of 
which are legitimate aims as expressly defined in Article 11.226  In light 
                                                          
 224. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 76-78 
(2002) (agreeing with the Constitutional Court that the preservation of secularism 
was necessary in order to protect national security, public safety, the rights and 
freedoms of others, and to prevent disorder or crime).  All such interests constitute 
legitimate aims for the purposes of Article 11.  Id.  See also Socialist Party v. Turkey, 
App. No. 21237/93, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 51, 80-81 (1998) (holding that the 
proscription of the Socialist Party in furtherance of national security constituted a 
legitimate aim); Zana v. Turkey, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2533, 2547 (1997) (finding a 
legitimate aim in the protection of territorial integrity and crime prevention).  This 
case proves especially instructive in evaluating Batasuna’s dissolution.  The applicant 
in Zana made statements demonstrating his support for the armed separatist struggle 
which the PKK, an illegal terrorist organization, was waging against the central 
Turkish government.  Id. at 2549 (citing remarks in which the applicant referred to 
the acts of violence committed by PKK militants as part of a “national liberation 
struggle”).  The Commission concluded, and the Court agreed, that such comments, 
coming from persons of a certain political status, could “reasonably lead the national 
authorities to fear a stepping up of terrorist activities in the country.”  Id. at 2546-47 
(holding that Turkey’s actions constituted the “legitimate aims” of preserving 
territorial integrity, and preventing crime). 
 225. Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 80-81. 
 226. See ORDER, supra note 8, at 332 (identifying the subsidiary effects of alleged 
HB-E.T.A coordination as affronts to the life, security, freedom and patrimony of 
persons and public institutions with the goal of subverting constitutional order and 
public peace).  The temporary proscription of Batasuna, as an entity inextricably 
linked with E.T.A., serves the interests of national security and public safety.  Id.  See 
also L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement § I (identifying the law’s objective as one of 
guaranteeing fundamental freedoms of the citizenry and preventing political parties 
from employing policies predicated on violence, terror, and the violation of the 
rights and freedoms of others); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 5 
(describing the atmosphere of intimidation that plagues the lives of those Basques 
who do not identify with the goals of Batasuna and E.T.A.).  The Public Prosecutor 
asserts that, in collaborating with E.T.A. to create such an atmosphere, Batasuna has 
infringed upon the freedoms of opinion, expression, education, press, movement of 
the Basque population and the right to hold elected office.  See id.  (noting that the 
confluence of pro-E.T.A. propaganda and terrorist attacks on newspapers, 
journalists, professors, and politicians have resulted in the domestic exile of many 
Basques and an atmosphere of trepidation throughout the Basque Country).  The 
Ministry of the Interior issued a report chronicling the effects of terrorism on the 
freedom of expression in the Basque Country during 2002.  The report cited a study 
conducted in the University of the Basque Country concluding that ten percent of 
Basque journalists have received threats from E.T.A. and further, that three-quarters 
of the journalists surveyed consider that the exercise of their profession in Euskadi is 
different from the experience of journalists in any other region due to the threats 
and attacks of E.T.A. and the volatile climate of confrontation and political pressure.  
OFICINA DE RELACIONES INFORMATIVAS Y SOCIALES, MINISTERIO DEL INTERIOR, 
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of the E.C.H.R.’s precedent, such objectives will surely constitute 
legitimate aims within the meaning of its Article 11 jurisprudence.227 
Finally, the E.C.H.R. will likely hold that Batasuna’s proscription 
was “necessary in a democratic society” thus satisfying the final 
element.228  The factors that the E.C.H.R. employed in its analyses of 
Refah Partisi and Socialist Party apply with equal force through analogy 
and advocate more strongly in favor of the measure’s consonance 
with the E.C.H.R.’s jurisprudence. 
Whereas in Refah Partisi, the dissolution sought to prevent the 
establishment of a plurality of legal systems and, in Spain, the divisive 
element is nationality rather than religion, the implications for the 
affected community are analogous.  Any plan for autonomy, shared 
or otherwise, would subject those citizens who recognize their 
Spanish identity to a legal and political regime with which they do 
not identify.  Statistically, the majority of Basque citizens regard 
themselves not as exclusively Basque, but rather recognize a dual 
identity.  Further, only nineteen percent of the population supports 
secession from Spain.229  Any State concessions toward the secession 
of the Basque Country would similarly do away with the Spanish 
State’s role as a guarantor of individual rights and freedoms forcing 
                                                          
CRONOLOGÍA—2002 “E.T.A. CONTRA LA LIBERTAD DE EXPRESIÓN” [OFFICE OF 
INFORMATION AND SOCIAL RELATIONS, MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, CHRONOLOGY  2002—
“E.T.A. AGAINST THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION”], at http://www.mir.es/oris/prensa/ 
2002.htm (last visited June 29, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 227. The court has not had occasion to expound significantly on this prong of the 
Article 11 test, as it has not generally served as a grounds for contention.  See United 
Communist Party v. Turkey, 62 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 20 (1998) (holding that the 
dissolution of the Communist party on the grounds that it promoted a distinction 
between Turks and Kurds pursued the legitimate aims of territorial integrity and 
national security); Zana, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2547 (finding that a restriction on the 
freedom of expression of a political figure who verbalized his support for the PKK 
terrorist movement furthered the legitimate aims of preservation of territorial 
integrity and the prevention of crime).  The court in United Communist Party did note, 
however, that a proscription based solely on the party’s use of the word “communist” 
in its name would not satisfy any of the legitimate aims set forth in Article 11.  62 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. at 20. 
 228. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 (voicing that a state may apply such 
severe measures in only the most serious cases); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 
(imposing strict construction of Article 11 exceptions in the context of political 
parties and noting that “only convincing and compelling reasons can justify 
restrictions on such parties’ freedoms of association”); see also United Communist Party, 
62 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23 (establishing that political proscription is subject to rigorous 
scrutiny and holding that Turkey’s dissolution of the Communist Party constituted a 
violation of Article 11). 
 229. See LUIS MORENO, THE FEDERALIZATION OF SPAIN 5 & 8 n.6 (John Laughlin ed., 
2001) (reporting that approximately fifty-seven percent of Basque citizens claim a 
dual identity thus diminishing the viability of secession as a solution and also that 
only approximately twenty-seven percent of the citizenry identifies itself as exclusively 
Basque). 
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the State to concede all exercise of authority over the region to the 
autonomous government.  Such a concession would also fail to 
achieve the balance to which the court referred in Refah Partisi 
between claims of one group to be governed by their own rules and 
the interests of the rest of the Basque population.230  As the majority 
of the Basque population has expressed equal allegiance to Spain as 
to the Basque Country, in permitting secession the Spanish State 
would effectively permit the Ulsterization of the nation, that is, the 
polarization of the population into nationalist and loyalist factions 
resulting in a continental Northern Ireland.231 
Both Refah Partisi and Socialist Party demonstrate that the E.C.H.R. 
routinely lends compelling weight to the party’s declared position 
regarding violence as a political method.232  A similar argument forms 
the crux of the Government’s contention regarding Batasuna’s role 
in the perpetuation of terrorist violence.233  Both the Government and 
the Public Prosecutor have thoroughly documented not only 
Batasuna’s expression of solidarity with E.T.A.’s cause of Basque 
autonomy but also its acceptance of the violent means employed to 
that end.234  For example, one of Batasuna’s National Cabinet 
members threatened, “if President Aznar wants war, the abertzale [left] 
and Euskal Herria [Basque Country] will respond with war.”235  Also, 
on August 11, 2002, at a rally in San Sebastian, members of the 
Batasuna directorate were involved in cheers supporting E.T.A, “gora 
E.T.A. militarra” [long live E.T.A.].236  Just as Zana’s comments came 
at a time of particular societal tension, Batasuna’s statements 
                                                          
 230. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 86 (explaining that a bifurcated “system 
would undeniably infringe the principle of non-discrimination between individuals 
as regards their enjoyment of public freedoms”). 
 231. Giles Tremlett, Basques Back Poll on Free State, GUARDIAN (London) (Oct. 28, 
2002) (noting that critics of Ibarretxe’s plan for a free state have suggested that it 
could result in the discrimination of non-Basques who have settled in the region), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,2763,820526,00.html (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  The article noted that a study showed 
that one in five Basques feared the plan’s implications for non-native Basques.  Id. 
 232. See Refah Partisi, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 88 (holding that statements of party 
leaders revealed the party’s acceptance of violence as a political method and its 
animus toward the central State); Socialist Party, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 84 (concluding 
that the chairman’s statements did not advocate violence or encourage secession 
from Turkey). 
 233. The prevention of such political participation in terrorist enterprise was the 
impetus behind the Law of Political Parties. See L.O.P.P. Purpose Statement § I 
(recognizing the importance of identifying those political parties that base their 
political activities on violence, terror, discrimination, exclusion, and violation of the 
freedoms and rights of others). 
 234. See generally PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 20; GOVERNMENT’S 
COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 19-28. 
 235. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 20. 
 236. Id. at 19. 
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immediately followed a brutal E.T.A. attack that claimed the lives of a 
fifty-seven-year-old man and a six-year-old girl at a beach resort, 
revealing the party’s constructive support for the violent means 
E.T.A. employs to achieve its political aims.237 
Further, just as the E.C.H.R. lent probative weight to the Welfare 
Party’s failure to disassociate itself with the more radical factions that 
extolled the use of political violence, so the Government, the Public 
Prosecutor, Garzón, and the Supreme Court have identified 
Batasuna’s similar failure as evidence of its complicity with E.T.A.’s 
terrorist enterprise.  Such complicity is reflected in the Supreme 
Court’s use of the term “double militancy” to refer to those members 
of the Batasuna party who also maintain connections to E.T.A.238  
Currently, four of Batasuna’s seven parliamentarians, including party 
spokesman Arnaldo Otegi, have been convicted of terrorist crimes.239  
In further demonstrating Batasuna’s complicity with E.T.A., not only 
did the Supreme Court cite Batasuna’s lone abstention from various 
non-partisan declarations against the use of violence,240 but it also 
identified explicit statements in which Batasuna’s spokesman Arnaldo 
Otegi exhorted the Basque Government to “disobey the State [or] 
assume the consequences.”241  Following the issuance of Garzón’s 
order, Otegi also made statements denouncing the judge as a puppet 
of the Spanish state and warned that the “Basque people were 
organizing themselves for a fight . . . so that a Spanish fascist would 
never again be able to dictate to the Basques what they must learn 
nor the form that their internal institutions must assume.”242  Like 
those of Zana and the Welfare Party, Batasuna’s statements clearly 
                                                          
 237. See id. at 12-13 (lending significance to the fact that Batasuna was the only 
party that refused to sign on to the condemnation); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra 
note 106, at 19 (noting that Otegi, Batasuna’s spokesman, justified the attacks as the 
product of the State’s ineffective political policy). 
 238. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 10-19. 
 239. Id.; see also GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 12-13. 
 240. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 20-22 (noting Batasuna’s 
consistent refusal to condemn E.T.A. attacks); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 
88, at 12-14 (noting that Batasuna representatives at all echelons of the Spanish 
government uniformly refused to sign the non-partisan condemnations of recent 
E.T.A. attacks); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 20-21 (observing 
Batasuna’s failure to sign the multi-lateral condemnation which expressed sympathy 
for the families of the victims and demanded the dissolution of E.T.A.).  The Basque 
Nationalist Party signed the condemnation as did the traditionally antagonistic 
Popular Party.  Id.  Batasuna has expressly stated that its refusal to condemn the acts 
of E.T.A. is a symbol of its identity, further supporting its complicity with the terrorist 
organization.  Id. 
 241. PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 19-20. 
 242. See GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, supra note 106, at 19-28 (enumerating 
Batasuna’s violations of the Law of Political Parties since its effective date in order to 
address issues of retroactivity). 
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reflect not only its tacit support for E.T.A.’s terrorist campaign but 
also evidence its affirmative complicity with the organization.243  
Consequently, its dissolution analogously serves a “pressing social 
need.” 
Finally, regarding proportionality, whereas both of the Turkish 
decisions prohibited party members from running for office for five 
years, neither judicial decision nor the relevant law precludes 
Batasuna’s representatives from occupying their electoral seats or 
from running in future elections under the auspices of another 
party.244  Furthermore, whereas the dissolutions in both Refah Partisi 
and Socialist Party were permanent and immediate, with no provision 
for domestic recourse or independent judicial review, the Supreme 
Court’s proscription of Batasuna followed a temporary suspension for 
investigative purposes245 and also provides for appeal before the 
Constitutional Court.246  The Spanish measure thus provides a 
comprehensive system of safeguards to insure not only the factual 
propriety of the dissolution, but also effective and independent 
judicial review.247  The dissolution, preceded by a temporary and 
limited precautionary measure, when weighed against the severity of 
the threat it seeks to prevent, belies any serious claim of 
                                                          
 243. Also relevant to the question of complicity is the fact that Batasuna’s 
spokesman, Otegi, shares his parliamentary seat with Josu Ternera who is currently 
under Supreme Court subpoena, wanted for his involvement in a 1987 E.T.A. attack 
that claimed the lives of eleven people.  See PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, 
at 7 (noting that in 1990, a French court convicted ex-E.T.A. director, Ternera, of 
membership in a terrorist organization); Justicia presenta los 23 cargos contra Batasuna 
[Justice Presents 23 Charges Against Batasuna], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (enumerating the 
twenty-three charges that the Ministry of Justice filed against Batasuna in its report 
on Aug. 21, 2002), at http://www.elpais.es/temas/dossieres/leydepartidos/ 
23cargos.html (last visted Sept. 17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 244. ORDER, supra note 8, at 343.  In anticipation of the Basque elections in May, 
2003, a new party recently applied for inscription in the political register.  M. Alonso, 
Elkarri se ofrece a los proetarras para que puedan concurrir a las elecciones [The Elkarri Party 
Volunteers to Represent E.T.A. Supporters So That They May Participate in Elections], ABC 
(Feb. 14, 2003) (reporting that the party hoped to provide an alternative legal 
platform under which ex-Batasuna members could run in the May elections). 
 245. C.P. arts. 192 & 520 (limiting a lower court’s suspension or dissolution to a 
period of five years); ORDER, supra note 8, at 344 (setting the suspension’s duration at 
three years renewable up to five years). 
 246. See L.O.P.P. art. 11 (providing for appeal in the form of the protective appeal 
before the Constitutional Court); SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 198 
(stating that the decision is final subject to review only before the Constitutional 
Court). 
 247. See Finn, supra note 169, at 68 (noting the importance of the incorporation of 
a mechanism for judicial review of political proscription); JOHN E. FINN, 
CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS:  POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 134 (1991) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS] (noting that “the proscription process, if it is 
to be retained, must be redrafted to include an objective standard capable of 
independent review . . . ”). 
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disproportionality.  When viewed in light of relevant E.C.H.R. 
jurisprudence, it is likely that the proscription of Batasuna will survive 
any potential Article 11 challenge. 
IV. EFFECTS OF PROSCRIPTION ON TERRORISM AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL PROSCRIPTION IN COMBATING 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
Justice Felix Frankfurter once warned that “[f]ocusing attention on 
constitutionality tends to make constitutionality synonymous with 
wisdom.”248  Thus, limiting the consideration of proscription to the 
foregoing legal analysis, without a pragmatic inquiry into its practical 
effects, would be of doubtful utility to nations considering the 
incorporation of such a measure into a counter-terrorism strategy.249 
Proscription generally serves two classes of objectives:  one practical 
and the other presentational.250  The practical rationale for 
proscription looks to the measure’s pragmatic effects on the 
incidence of political violence within a given country.251  More 
commonly, however, proscription serves a presentational purpose in 
affording a State the appearance of intransigence in its crusade 
against terrorism.252 
With regard to practical analyses, empirical evidence is of 
consummate importance in evaluating the efficacy of restrictions on 
political freedoms.253  However, discord plagues the debate over the 
merits of political proscription, which suffers from a pronounced and 
                                                          
 248. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 556 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (upholding the conviction of three defendants under the Smith Act for 
conspiracy to organize the Communist Party as a group advocating the overthrow of 
the Government by force). 
 249. See Finn, supra note 169, at 65 (providing that “[a] policy that may be justified 
as a matter of constitutional theory is not for that reason alone a good policy”). 
 250. See HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 143, 246 (explaining that the 
presentational rationale for proscription attempts “to remove public manifestations 
of the existence of, and support for, terrorist[s] rather than to prevent terrorism as 
such”). 
 251. See id. (finding that the Prevention of Terrorism Act served the practical 
purpose of easing prosecution). 
 252. See Finn, supra note 169, at 66 (identifying four functions of proscription:  
legitimating, integrating, socializing, and systematizing); Walter F. Murphy, Excluding 
Political Parties:  Problems for Democratic and Constitutional Theory, in GERMANY AND ITS 
BASIC LAW:  PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 173 (Paul 
Kirchof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (discouraging states from employing the 
presentational rationale as its sole justification for banning a political party). 
 253. See Finn, supra note 169, at 67 (“[A]nalysis of the relationship between 
democracy and violence should be informed by empirical evidence and by detailed 
case studies.”); Dan Gordon, Limits on Extremist Political Parties:  A Comparison of Israeli 
Jurisprudence With That of the United States and Germany, 10 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 347, 392 (1987) (determining that empirical evidence could prove decisive in 
reaching conclusions regarding the necessity and efficacy of political proscription). 
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often cited dearth of empirical research.254  An analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages commonly associated with political 
proscription255 juxtaposed with the experiences of other Western 
democracies256 will serve as the rubric under which this section will 
attempt to lend preliminary insight into the promise of proscription 
in combating political violence in the Basque Country. 
Many Western nations currently provide for the proscription of 
political parties either statutorily or constitutionally.257  The 
experiences of these nations have produced useful paradigms for 
analyzing the utility of Batasuna’s proscription. 
The failure of the Weimar Republic258 provided fodder for the most 
compelling arguments in favor of proscription.259  Inherent in this 
                                                          
 254. See Finn, supra note 169, at 56 (noting the empirical void that exists in 
scholarly research regarding the practical effects of proscription on political 
terrorism); Gordon, supra note 253, at 385 (criticizing both opponents and 
proponents of proscription for employment of statistical claims in the absence of any 
compelling empirical evidence).  “The dearth of unambiguous empirical data in an 
area where such evidence would be decisive may account for the rarefied character 
of much of this debate.”  Id. 
 255. See Finn, supra note 169, at 65-67 (discussing both the virtues and potential 
vices inherent in any State’s decision to ban a political party); see also Gordon, supra 
note 253, at 392 (addressing the continuing nature of the debate over the efficacy of 
political proscription and comparing the arguments that have emerged on both sides 
of that debate). 
 256. See Murphy, supra note 252, at 188 (noting the failure of political proscription 
to effectively suppress the popular opinions propounded by the suspended parties); 
see also CHALK, supra note 1, at 103 (finding that the repressive policy in Italy resulted 
in a restriction upon the rights of citizens without correlative success in counter-
terrorism efforts).  “[T]he widespread use of crime by association . . . merely had the 
effect of increasing support for and recruitment to left-wing terrorist organizations.”  
Id. 
 257. See Finn, supra note 169, at 70-73 (enumerating the various nations that 
currently maintain provisions allowing for the bans on political parties including 
Western democracies such as Austria, France, Germany, the Republic of Ireland, 
Northern Ireland, Israel and Italy); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 16-805 to -806 (1956 & 
Supp. 2002) (incorporating legislation that remains as a vestige of the United States’ 
anti-Communist crusade).  Section 16-806 reads in pertinent part: 
The Communist Party of the United States, or any successors of such 
party . . . the object of which is to overthrow by force or violence the 
government of the United States, or the government of the state of 
Arizona . . . shall not be entitled to be recognized or certified as a political 
party under the laws of the state of Arizona and shall not be entitled to any 
of the privileges, rights or immunities attendant upon legal political bodies 
recognized under the laws of the state of Arizona . . . . 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 16-806.   
HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 138 (describing the proscription provisions that 
have existed in Northern Ireland in various forms since that country’s enactment of 
the Criminal Law and Proceedings Act of 1887).  The authors note that the British 
government employed these provisions to outlaw a number of political organizations 
during the course of the “Troubles.”  Id.  Sinn Fein, once regarded as the political 
front for the Irish Republican Army, numbered among those proscribed 
organizations until it became legal in 1974.  Id. 
 258. The Weimar Republic was the failed experiment in democracy that 
succeeded the collapse of the German monarchy at the conclusion of World War I.  
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argument is the concept of the “militant democracy”260 which asserts 
that “the polity need not commit suicide by allowing those people 
                                                          
See DAVID DYZENHAUS, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY:  CARL SCHMITT, HANS KELSEN, AND 
HERMANN HELLER IN WEIMAR 17 (1997) (providing a concise history of the rise and 
fall of the Weimar Republic).  A popularly elected National Assembly convened in 
the German city of Weimar in 1919 to create a new constitutional regime.  Id.  It 
drafted the two-part constitution and created the Republic of the Reich.  Id. at 18.  
This new constitution, however, was plagued with fatal internal contradictions.  Id. at 
20 (noting that the constitution required the Reichstag to supervise the president’s 
use of his emergency powers but also allowed the president to dissolve the 
Reichstag).  Scholars have argued that the demise of the Weimar Republic resulted 
less from the abuse of the president’s extensive emergency powers employed by 
Hitler to dismantle the Republic, and more from the Republic’s fatally equivocal 
stance with regard to proscription.  See Finn, supra note 169, at 63 (postulating that 
Weimar’s demise lay in its failure to ban the National Socialist Party). 
 259. See Finn, supra note 169, at 63 (asserting that “Weimar fell because it could 
not respond to challenges to constitutionalism disguised in the language of 
democratic legality.”) (internal quotation omitted).  Professor Finn explains the 
dominant theory regarding the failure of Weimarian politics.  He asserts that the 
Weimerian ideology was formed in large part by the jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen 
who extolled the virtues of the “equal chance doctrine.”  Id. at 64.  This doctrine 
essentially “held that anyone willing to abide by the formal rules of electoral 
procedure could contest for power . . . [and did not limit participation] to political 
parties committed to the maintenance of constitutional democracy.”  Id.  A common 
condemnation of Weimarian politics derives from Carl Schmitt’s critical response to 
the Kelsenian theory outlined above.  Schmitt rejected the equal chance doctrine 
and argued that such liberalism is inherently self-subverting.  DYZENHAUS, supra note 
258, at 65.  Schmitt postulated that in allowing all parties equal access to the political 
process, regardless of their attitude toward the maintenance of democracy, the State 
creates the risk that an anti-democratic party may employ the legal political system to 
gain the power that will later allow it to bring about the destruction of that very same 
system.  Id. (arguing that untempered political liberalism will allow an anti-
democratic party to “shut behind [it] the door of legality through which [it] had 
entered.”).  Weimar’s failure arguably lies in its refusal to proscribe the Nazi party, 
thus preventing it from legitimately gaining the control that later allowed it to 
destroy the democratic regime.  CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS, supra note 247, at 156.  
One of the most common criticisms of the Weimar Republic was its failure to 
prohibit the National Socialist Party from participating in elections. Finn, supra note 
169, at 63.  See also Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, Constitutional Crisis:  The 
German and the American Experience, in WEIMAR:  A JURISPRUDENCE OF CRISIS 1, 14 
(Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000) (noting that the Weimar 
Republic’s last presidential cabinet transformed into a National Socialist 
dictatorship). 
 260. See Refah Partisi v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56, 83 
(2002) (classifying Turkey as a militant democracy); Finn, supra note 169, at 64 
(contextualizing the use of political proscription in nascent democracies); see also 
DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 
OF GERMANY 222 (1989) (explaining that the concept of the militant democracy in 
Germany derives from its experience with totalitarianism and dictatorship and was 
enshrined in numerous provisions of the country’s Basic Law).  Kommers elaborates 
on this principle identifying its emergence as a product of the ailing Weimar 
Republic, “namely its tolerance of extremist parties bent on destroying democracy.”  
Id.  The vulnerability of nascent democracies to the threats embodied in radical 
parties produced the perceived need to provide a mechanism by which democratic 
regimes could exclude those parties from political processes thereby preserving the 
integrity of the nation.  Id.  (identifying the manifestation of the notion of the 
militant democracy in various articles of the German Basic Law).  Kommers 
specifically references Article 21(2) which provides that “[p]arties which, by reason 
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who [reject the political order] to utilize its free and open processes 
to demolish those very processes.”261  In accordance with this 
principle, proponents of proscription argue, with notable force in the 
case of Batasuna,262 that no justification exists for depriving a 
democracy of the means to defend itself against a party that seeks to 
undermine its legitimacy.263  This thesis is compelling with regard to 
the Spanish government’s right to protect itself from those factions, 
such as Batasuna, that seek to destroy the Spanish State as it exists 
today. 
One risk inherent in the employment of proscription is its 
potential for abuse.264  The slippery slope argument posits that 
                                                          
of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free 
democratic basic order or endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, shall be unconstitutional.”  Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 261. Murphy, supra note 252, at 180 (concluding that “[i]n short, a democracy 
may punish or exclude those whose clear aim is to destroy the system.”). 
 262. Spain arguably falls within the “defending democracy” paradigm 
promulgated in research regarding liberal state responses to political violence and 
terrorism.  See Pedahzur, supra note 169, at 5 (establishing a tripartite rubric under 
which to examine the correlation between the degrees of repression employed in 
combating political violence and the level of democratic infrastructure characteristic 
of each of three nations:  Israel, Germany, and the United States).  In her analysis, 
the author cites three classes of democracies:  “militant,” “defending,” and 
“immunized.”  Id.  The “defending democracy” paradigm has elicited various 
definitions and is generally regarded as a type of democracy that excludes individuals 
or organizations, the aims of which “may endanger the state, its political regime or 
the basic national consensus.”  Id.  Such states will exclude political parties from 
elections so long as there is constitutional or legislative predicate for doing so and 
generally rely on a criminal justice model in responding to terrorism.  Id. at 13.  As 
distinguished from the militant and defending models, the author identifies the 
“immunized democracy” as representative of a Lockian liberal approach with 
“minimal penetration of the state into the social sphere.”  Id. at 14-15.  Such a state 
operates wholly within the boundaries of the law and subjects all state responses to 
violence to judicial review.  Id. at 15.  These states will generally exclude a party from 
free elections only upon finding that it “constitutes a clear and present danger to the 
regime and consequently to the society.”  Id. at 15.  The United States is exemplary of 
the “immunized democracy.”  Id. 
 263. See Murphy, supra note 252, at 191 (explaining that the theory of a militant 
democracy “allows government to exclude certain kinds of peaceful efforts to change 
the system.”); see also Finn, supra note 169, at 64 (stating that “proscription hopes to 
save democracy from its own excesses.”). 
 264. See Finn, supra note 169, at 67 (citing the utility of an inquiry into how and in 
what ways the decision to ban parties may have provided the basis for further state 
activities designed to censor or harass anti-democratic forces in assessing the 
possibility for abuse).  Finn cited a study, which demonstrated that following the 
German decision to proscribe the Communist party, preliminary inquisitions from 
state prosecutors increased from 7,975 to 12,600 the following year.  Id. (citing 
Donald P. Kommers, The Spiegel Affair:  A Case Study in Judicial Politics, in POLITICAL 
TRIALS 15 (Theodore L. Becker ed., 1971)); see also Gordon, supra note 253, at 391 
(positing that bans hold dangerous potential to become legitimate State weapons of 
political struggle).  While acknowledging the potential for abuse, the author claims 
that empirical evidence suggests that a slippery slope does not exist.  Id. at 392.  
Gordon notes that despite the proscriptions of two parties in both Israel and 
Germany, there is no evidence to suggest that they have or will lead to similar action 
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proscribing one group “pushes other groups to the brink of 
illegality.”265  This argument fails, however, to distinguish between 
terrorist fronts like Batasuna and opposition parties, like the P.N.V., 
that conform their activities to standards inherent in societies 
governed by the rule of law.266 
In Spain, such distinctions are of paramount importance in 
illustrating that the proscription of Batasuna has as its foundation not 
the prohibition of an ideology but rather of the means employed in 
promoting that ideology.267  For example, the Basque Nationalist 
Party was one of the most influential promulgators of a Basque 
nationalist policy yet operates wholly within the institution of national 
mainstream politics.268 
Opponents of proscription often speculate that bans will serve only 
to romanticize the cause, converting its fallen soldiers into martyrs.269  
                                                          
against any other party or organization in either nation.  Id. 
 265. Gordon, supra note 253, at 391.  While often problematic, such concerns 
resound in the recent decision of the National Court’s Public Prosecutor to initiate a 
similar proceeding against the Communist Party of Spain, the alleged political wing 
of GRAPO, a leftist terrorist organization.  See La fiscalía pide la suspensión del P.C.E.(r) 
al considerar que es el brazo político de los GRAPO [The Public Prosecutor Requests the 
Suspension of the P.C.E.(r) Alleging it to be the Political Arm of GRAPO], ESTRELLA DIGITAL 
(reporting that the Public Prosecutor filed a request for the party’s suspension with 
the National Court), at http://www.estrelladigital.es/021023/articulos/espana/ 
grapo.asp. (last visited Oct. 23, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review).  This application to the National Court comes only two months after the 
Public Prosecutor and the Government took similar action against Batasuna. 
 266. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 392 (noting the relative ease with which 
governments can distinguish between extremist parties and traditional opposition 
parties, “which accept ‘the rules of the game’”). 
 267. See generally ORDER, supra note 8 (enumerating, in extensive and extremely 
precise detail, throughout approximately 350 pages of material supporting this 
decision, the actions that evidence H.B.-E.H.-Batasuna’s connections with E.T.A.).  
Judge Garzón’s order states that the objective of the ban is to prevent activity that 
furthers terrorism and the subsidiary effects resulting therefrom.  Id.  In doing so he 
claims that Batasuna  allowed E.T.A. to use its headquarters to plan many of its 
attacks, provided shelter to its members, contributed to the terrorization of the 
citizenry, and defended the “institutional front” of the terrorist organization.  Id. 
 268. See Mees, supra note 19, at 804 (identifying the Basque Nationalist Party as 
instrumental in procuring a referendum regarding the Statute of Basque Autonomy 
ratified in 1978).  The author also credits Sabino Arana, the founder of the P.N.V., 
with providing the impetus for the influence that the party wielded in the 1980s.  Far-
reaching Basque autonomy in matters of tax policy, education, industrial policy, and 
justice evidences the power of the P.N.V. in effecting change in the Basque Country.  
See id. at 809 (concluding that radical nationalists have never recognized these steps 
in the process of Basque nation-building as they view autonomy as an obstacle to self-
determination).  Mees notes the cleavage that exists within the nationalist movement 
between the majority, peaceful, and democratic wing and the minority faction that 
condones the use of violence to vindicate its Basque identity.  Id. at 805. 
 269. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 391 (arguing that the banned organization 
could potentially gain strength from proscription); United in Error:  Spain’s Ban on 
Batasuna Will Not Help, supra note 14 (expressing the measure’s futility and 
predicting that proscription will have the sole effect of converting Batasuna members 
into martyrs). 
SAWYER.AUTHORCHANGES2.DOC 11/3/2003  11:47 AM 
2003] SPAIN’S PROSCRIPTION OF BATASUNA 1577 
The argument continues that in making a martyr of the restricted 
party, the State risks conceding a degree of its own legitimacy in 
appearing that it feared allowing the people a genuine choice 
between the existing system and the radical party’s platform.270 This 
argument fails in the case of Spain as, among its supporters, E.T.A. 
militants have already achieved a certain degree of martyrdom.271  
Additionally, the existence of legitimate political parties that advocate 
for an autonomous Basque Country yet also function within bounds 
of democracy belies the argument that the Spanish state fears a 
challenge to its standing policy regarding Basque autonomy.272 
Proponents of proscription often make a contrary argument.  They 
assert that permitting a terrorist front to participate in elections 
inherently confers upon it the legitimacy associated with law abiding 
parties.273  Bans can serve as a denunciation of the radical party’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the State and of democracy in general.274  
Proscription can further serve a presentational function, 
demonstrating the State’s intransigent stance with regard to the 
suppression of terrorism and instilling confidence in its citizenry.275 
                                                          
 270. Gordon, supra note 253, at 391; see also CHALK, supra note 1, at 99-103 
(examining the effects of relatively repressive counter-terrorism measures in 
democratic nations); Finn, supra note 169, at 66 (identifying the risk that 
proscription could delegitimize the electoral process). 
 271. See Jose Manuel Mata, La estrategia de la insurrección [The Strategy of 
Insurrection], EL PAÍS (Madrid) (reporting that one of the unifying factors of Batasuna 
members is their common perception of incarcerated E.T.A. operatives as heroes), at 
http://www.elpais.es/temas/dossiers/ledepartidos/batasuna.html (last visited Sept. 
17, 2002) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 272. See supra note 268 (discussing the role of P.N.V. as a political advocate for 
Basque nationalism that nonetheless operates within the established political 
mainstream). 
 273. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 390 (deriving support for this argument in the 
case of the Israeli politician Meir Kahan).  Gordon explains that had the Israeli 
Supreme Court banned Kahan’s party from running in Knesset elections it could 
have denied Kahan the legitimacy that afforded him a seat in the Congress and the 
attendant protected speech that Israeli law confers on its members and thus “nipped 
the ‘Kahanist’ phenomenon in the bud.” Id. 
 274. See id. (noting that the dichotomous nature of the positive effects often 
associated with proscription weaken the target party while simultaneously 
strengthening the ruling regime); see also WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113 (observing 
that some legislation serves a symbolic function of “expressing public revulsion . . . and 
reassuring the public that something is being done.”). 
 275. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 391 (observing that in banning the Socialist 
Reich Party, the Bonn government achieved “the prestige which the vacillating 
Weimar Republic never had”).  Here, the author notes that the government’s 
proscription of the Socialist Reich Party and the Communist Party (KPD) did not 
result in increased popular support for either party or a loss of confidence in the 
strength of the nascent democratic regime.  Id.  See also HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 
2, at 246 (articulating the “presentational” justification for proscription).  The 
authors derive this term from the Jellicoe Report on the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
of 1976 in Northern Ireland.  Id.  The report justified the existence of the power to 
proscribe as “presentational” rather than “practical” in that its object was “to remove 
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Opponents also argue against the efficacy of bans stating that the 
proscribed organizations will simply reappear under the guise of 
another party or will employ some extra-parliamentary means to 
reestablish support.276  This reasoning similarly fails in the case of 
Batasuna as the proscription Order expressly prohibits the party’s 
constituents from reorganizing under any other name.277  Further, the 
Law of Political Parties expressly articulates the conduct that may 
result in proscription.  Thus, should Batasuna reorganize under some 
alternate guise, the Law of Political Parties and the Supreme Court’s 
order would presumably render any such organization illegal and its 
assets subject to seizure.278 
This seizure of assets is also an invaluable part of the Spanish 
proscriptive legislation.  Capital is the oxygen that allows a terrorist 
enterprise to thrive and the seizure provision serves the extremely 
practical purpose of denying a party the means by which it operates.279  
                                                          
public manifestations of the existence of, and support for, terrorist organizations, 
rather than to prevent terrorism as such.”  Id. 
 276. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 389 (finding support for his view in the 
reappearance of the DKP (German Communist Party) in West Germany pursuant to 
the proscription of the KPD (Communist Party of Germany)).  Gordon also cites 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), which 
expressed doubt regarding the “long range effectiveness of legislative bans in 
stopping the rise of the Communist movement.”  Id. at 389 n.255 (quoting Dennis, 
341 U.S. at 578) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 277. See L.O.P.P. art. 3 (prohibiting political parties from employing registration 
materials that identify it or otherwise coincide with those of a suspended or 
proscribed party); ORDER, supra note 8, at 344 (providing for the suspension of 
activities undertaken in the names of H.B., E.H., Batasuna and any other name they 
should choose to adopt). 
 278. See SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 108-09 (denying the 
Prosecution’s request for a prospective ban including parties yet to be formed but 
stating that any party that attempts to continue to serve as E.T.A.’s political wing may 
expect a similar fate); PROSECUTOR’S COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 63-64 (requesting 
that the effects of the proscription extend to all new political parties formed to 
circumvent the ruling as well as to any existing party which acts as a successor to the 
banned party or continues its activities); La Fiscalia evitará que Batasuna concurra 
‘camuflada’ a las proximas elecciones [The Public Prosecutor Will Preclude Batasuna from 
Running in “Camouflage” in the Next Elections], EUROPA PRESS (Madrid/San Sebastian) 
(Mar. 31, 2003) (reporting that the Attorney General stated that his office intends to 
initiate proceedings against any party that it suspects of serving as a front for 
Batasuna’s participation in the May elections), available at http://es.news. 
yahoo.com/fot/ftxt/20030331195943.html (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 279. See HOGAN & WALKER, supra note 2, at 143 (suggesting that seizing and 
forfeiting assets and shutting down facilities are practical measures in curbing 
political violence); see also Richards, supra note 9, at 79 (claiming that the British 
government, in granting Sinn Fein the financial subsidies that all democratic parties 
receive, “helped [the party] to achieve its highest electoral support in modern times, 
before it resembled a democratic party”).  Richards faults the government for granting 
subsidies to Sinn Fein in the absence of any commensurate concessions from the 
I.R.A., thus implicitly recognizing the correlation between the financial status of the 
political front and the success of the terrorist organization.  Id. 
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This provision also lends legitimacy to the legislation in 
demonstrating that the ban has concrete pragmatic effects and is not 
merely an expression of State animus toward a particular party.280 
Finally, opponents argue that the efficacy of individualized 
criminal sanctions belie the necessity of proscription.281  This 
approach has encountered criticism and, in practice, has proven 
insufficient in responding to political violence.282  Spain has long 
since employed the “criminal justice model” in sanctioning political 
violence.283  As reflected in Batasuna’s consistent and extensive 
collaboration with E.T.A., this less restrictive approach has proven 
insufficient in deterring the party from supporting E.T.A.’s campaign 
of terror.284  In addition to employing criminal sanctions, the Spanish 
government has also ceded an extraordinary degree of autonomy to 
                                                          
 280. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 390 (identifying the risk that citizens could 
perceive the proscription of a party as an “admission of failure” on the part of the 
State); see also Richards, supra note 9, at 85 (condemning the British government for 
allowing the I.R.A. to make substantial electoral advances).  The Supreme Court’s 
opinion orders the dissolution of the party and the distribution of all proceeds from 
the liquidation of Batasuna’s assets among its creditors along with the dissolution of 
the party.  SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT, supra note 13, at 196. 
 281. See Gordon, supra note 253, at 386 (citing Justice Barak of the Israeli 
Supreme Court who identified the criminal justice system as one of the “accepted 
tools with which the democracy can protect itself”).  Barak argued that in the 
presence of sufficient criminal sanctions there is “no need to take the drastic means 
of denying the right to be elected.”  Id. 
 282. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 223 (rejecting the sole use of the criminal justice 
system due to the inefficacy of attempting to quell terrorism through employment of 
law enforcement and criminal sanctions alone).  Wilkinson argues that despite some 
notable successes of this approach, it nonetheless retains certain serious 
inadequacies.  Id.  For example, Wilkinson notes that in many nations, terrorists have 
escaped the reach of criminal sanctions by fleeing abroad and continuing to operate 
from outside their home nations.  Id. at 224.  Additionally, the author notes that it is 
often exceedingly easy for convicted terrorists to continue operating from within 
prison by influencing existing networks outside of the prison.  Id. 
 283. See C.P. tit. XXI (enumerating among the “offenses against the Constitution:” 
complicity with a terrorist organization, participation in an association that has as its 
objective the commission of a crime, and membership in a terrorist organization). 
 284. For example, the Spanish Penal Code expressly prohibits membership in a 
terrorist organization, yet these provisions have proved ineffective as Batasuna has 
consistently allowed members of E.T.A. to figure among its ranks.  See PROSECUTOR’S 
COMPLAINT, supra note 88, at 6-11 (naming those Batasuna members who maintain a 
joint association with both the political party and E.T.A.); GOVERNMENT’S COMPLAINT, 
supra note 106, at 12 (identifying those members of Batasuna convicted of 
collaborating with a terrorist organization); see also El Tribunal Supremo dicta orden de 
busca y captura internacional para el parlamentario de Batasuna [Supreme Court Issues Order 
for International Search and Capture of Batasuna’s Member of Parliament], ESTRELLA 
DIGITAL (evidencing the failure of Batasuna representative Josu Ternera to appear at 
two judicial proceedings and stating that his last appearance in public was in October 
of 2002 in Switzerland), at http://www.estrella digital.es/imprimir.asp (last visited 
June 29, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  The article states 
that the Supreme Court is currently investigating Ternera for ordering the E.T.A. 
attack of a Civil Guard’s quarters that resulted in the deaths of 11 people.  Id. 
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the Basque Country in its effort to appease nationalist factions.285  The 
inefficacy of such action further illustrates that the law is the last 
remaining means by which to insulate democratic society from the 
deleterious effects of political parties associated with terrorism.286 
All democracies must regard proscriptive legislation with the 
utmost suspicion and weigh its potential benefits carefully against the 
inherent restriction on freedom that it imports.287  However, the 
foregoing analysis suggests that Batasuna’s proscription promises to 
complement existing criminal sanctions by serving both practical and 
presentational rationales for proscription288—practical, in depriving 
Batasuna and thus E.T.A. of its financial support, and presentational 
in establishing a firm state position of intolerance for those political 
parties that seek refuge in the freedoms that they undermine and 
which are enshrined in the Constitution that they reject. 
CONCLUSION 
When considered with reference to recent E.C.H.R. jurisprudence, 
Spain’s proscription of Batasuna is likely to withstand any Article 11 
challenge brought pursuant to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  Political parties are obliged to operate within the bounds of 
                                                          
 285. See WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113 (classifying the Statute of Basque 
Autonomy as a form of “prophylaxis” or reform “designed to have a preventative 
effect by attempting to redress underlying grievances that might otherwise lead to 
extreme disaffection among sectors of the population”); see also Mees, supra note 19, 
at 804 (observing that the Basque Government currently enjoys autonomy regarding 
matters including education, taxation, industrial policy and justice). 
 286. Other research has found that, in certain circumstances, proscription 
arguably represents the least restrictive alternative in confronting the actions of 
political parties associated with terrorism.  See Gordon, supra note 253, at 387 (noting 
that those who argued in favor of a ban on the Kach party in Israel in 1984 “can now 
argue that Kach’s strength increased so much from Kahan’s election to the Knesset in 
1984” that any measure short of proscription would have proved insufficient).  
Gordon also noted that “the victory of the National Front in the 1986 French 
legislative elections was said to bestow legitimacy to its leader, Le Pen.”  Id. at 387 
n.246 
 287. WILKINSON, supra note 1, at 113, 115 (considering the way in which the 
subsidiary effects of repressive counter-terrorism measures should factor into states’ 
consideration of whether to impose such restrictions).  Wilkinson notes that in order 
to insure the legitimacy and democratic accountability of anti-terrorist legislation, 
civil authorities should control all aspects of its procurement and implementation 
and provide for judicial review of its application.  Id. at 117. 
 288. Generally writers have found the employment of the presentational rationale, 
alone, as insufficient justification for banning a political party.  See HOGAN & WALKER, 
supra note 2, at 143 (arguing that states should retain proscription as a security 
measure but should reject presentational grounds for such legislation).  The authors 
qualify their acceptance of proscription with two limiting principles.  The first 
qualification is the demonstrated necessity of “evidential shortcuts” and the second is 
that the system adopted ensures that membership “is shorthand for criminal activity.”  
Id. 
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the Constitution and of established notions of democracy.289  If a 
given party, in aligning itself with a terrorist organization, chooses 
not to do so, it may not, then, invoke those same constitutional 
principles as a shield nor seek legal refuge in the very provisions that 
it has chosen to violate.290  Legislative and judicial tolerance of such 
subversion would contravene the basic notions of democracy upon 
which all legal systems are predicated.  The newly ordained Law of 
Political Parties and subsequent judicial measures represent a 
coordinated and laudable national effort to lift from Batasuna the 
political facade behind which reside nothing less than popularly 
elected terrorists. 
The inherent challenge for any democracy engaged in the struggle 
against terrorism is always the reconciliation of individual civil 
liberties with an effective and unequivocal counter-terrorism policy.291  
In light of the protracted struggle with terrorism that lies ahead, this 
tension will necessarily inform the world’s legislative and judicial 
responses.  While it seems that Spain has succeeded in achieving that 
delicate balance,292 the response of the international legal system will 
ultimately define the juridical boundaries within which the nations of 
the world must wage their offensives.293  In an international 
community torn between its dedication to the war on terrorism and 
its veneration for democracy, states would be wise to heed the lessons 
that Spain’s experience will offer as the international legal system will 
be the force with which future counter-terrorism measures will have 
to contend. 
                                                          
 289. See supra note 166 (articulating the restrictions that the E.C.H.R. has imposed 
on the activities of political parties pursuant to the European Convention on Human 
Rights). 
 290. See Lawless v. Ireland, 3 Eur. Ct. H.R. (serv. A) 45 (1961) (stating that “no 
person may be able to take advantage of the provisions of the Convention to perform 
acts aimed at destroying the aforesaid rights and freedoms”). 
 291. See supra note 4 (identifying the reconciliation of civil liberties with state 
security as the greatest challenge for a democracy in confronting the threat of 
terrorism). 
 292. The Law of Political Parties has resulted in a clear articulation of behaviors 
that can lead to proscription, thus allowing parties to conform their activities to 
objective standards. See L.O.P.P. art. 9 (enumerating, in detail, the activities that can 
form the basis of a proscriptive order).  Moreover, the law provides for independent 
judicial review, thus protecting against the Government’s indiscriminate application 
of its provisions.  See id. art. 11 (providing for the protective appeal before the 
Constitutional Court).  Finally, the option of a temporary suspension lends itself to a 
thorough investigation of the facts and will prevent the courts from precipitously 
foreclosing on the legal and constitutional rights of a political party.  See ORDER, 
supra note 8 (stating that the purpose of the suspension was to facilitate the Court’s 
factual investigation). 
 293. See Head, supra note 5, at 73 (anticipating the growing role that international 
law and, more specifically, the European Convention on Human Rights will play in 
determining the propriety of counter-terrorism measures). 
